



# SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization

Publication #	<b>56421</b>	Revision:	<b>2.04</b>
Issue Date:	<b>January 2025</b>		

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## Revision History

Date	Revision	Description
January 2025	2.04	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added SEV-TIO Guest Request</li> <li>Added Secure AVIC backing page support</li> <li>Added GHCB Unregister support</li> </ul>
March 2023	2.03	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide support to retrieve an APIC ID list and enable running multiple VMPL levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added two new Hypervisor Feature bits</li> <li>Added two new NAE events</li> <li>Added a new GHCB MSR Protocol request</li> </ul> </li> <li>Document the SEV-SNP Confidential Computing Blob EFI protocol</li> <li>Add support to allow an SEV-ES guest to use the Page Stage Change protocols <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added one new Hypervisor Feature bit</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
January 2023	2.02	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added GUID definition for the VLEK certificate</li> <li>Added GUID definition for a CRL</li> <li>Updated documentation around SNP Guest Request / SNP Extended Guest Request SW_EXITINFO2 values</li> </ul>
July 2022	2.01	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated Secrets Page Guest Reserved Area to add upper 32 bits of the now 64-bit current guest request message sequence number.</li> <li>Added documentation for new error code 2 that can be used by hypervisor to return error information for malformed input</li> <li>Clarified language around AP Reset Hold return value</li> </ul>
March 2021	2.00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated specification for version 2</li> </ul>
March 2021	1.50	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added SEV_FEATURES input value to SNP AP Creation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added a statement around the expected use of the same interrupt injection mechanism as set in the BSP when creating APs using SNP AP Creation.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
March 2021	1.40	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Removed AP Jump Table and AP Reset Hold deprecation from feature advertisement</li> <li>Clarified when AP Jump Table and AP Reset Hold can be used</li> <li>Added two new error codes to SNP Page State Change <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Optional error conditions to help debug guest page state tracking</li> <li>An error code to encompass other unspecified error conditions</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
February 2021	1.30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added feature advertisement support in place of versioning</li> <li>Added SNP secrets page guest OS usage field definition</li> <li>Removed GHCB registration option for SEV-ES guests</li> <li>Clarified VALID_BITMAP requirements</li> </ul>
January 2021	1.20	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Update the SNP Extended Guest Request to return multiple certificates</li> <li>Added support for requesting an IPI with the Restricted Injection feature</li> <li>Added support for requesting a timer with the Restricted Injection feature</li> </ul>



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<b>Date</b>	<b>Revision</b>	<b>Description</b>
November 2020	1.10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added support for AP reset hold using the MSR protocol</li> <li>Restricted use of SW_SCRATCH location</li> <li>Added initial support for SEV-SNP</li> </ul>
August 2020	1.00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added examples of how to obtain the encryption bit position.</li> <li>Clarifications related to the supported NAE event list in regard to hypervisor and guest expectations.</li> <li>Clarification of how a VALID_BITMAP bit position for a GHCB quad word is calculated.</li> <li>Added an example of how to trigger MMIO #NPF using reserved bits.</li> <li>Added an example of how to set the starting vector (CS:IP) of an AP.</li> </ul>
January 2020	0.85	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added a statement of the CPUID settings that are required to be set for an SEV-ES guest (beyond normal settings)</li> <li>Updated the SMP Booting documentation and introduced an AP Jump Table set/get functionality to the list of VMGEXIT software definitions.</li> </ul>
June 2019	0.80	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Added a CPUID request / response protocol using the GHCB MSR for use before GHCB page is available.</li> <li>Updated how NMIs are handled under SEV-ES.</li> <li>Added a statement that the hypervisor must not intercept read and write access to the GHCB MSR.</li> <li>Updated guest termination codes.</li> <li>Added a section regarding hypervisor/VMMCALL exit requirements.</li> <li>Minor formatting changes and spelling corrections.</li> </ul>
March 2019	0.71	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated to the GHCB layout for improved hypercall usage.</li> <li>Added a way for a guest to request termination through VMGEXIT.</li> <li>Clarified GHCB Negotiation Example section.</li> <li>Added documentation about ensuring exclusive access to the GHCB during VMGEXIT usage.</li> <li>Added documentation about GHCB usage in NMI context.</li> </ul>
October 2018	0.70	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initial public release.</li> </ul>

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# 1 Introduction

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## 1.1 Overview

The Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) and the Secure Encrypted Virtualization – Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) features provide protection of the virtual machine, or guest, register state from the hypervisor. The guest's register state is encrypted during world switches and cannot be directly accessed or modified by the hypervisor. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP are documented in the [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Sections 15.35 and 15.36, respectively.

SEV-ES and SEV-SNP include architectural support for notifying a guest operating system (OS) when certain types of world switches are about to occur; these are called Non-Automatic Exits. This allows the guest OS to selectively share information with the hypervisor through the Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB).

When SEV-ES or SEV-SNP is enabled, a VMEXIT is classified as either an Automatic Exit (AE) or a Non-Automatic Exit (NAE), as documented in the [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Section 15.35.4. AE events are well defined and are events that do not involve or require exposing any guest register state. All other exit events are considered NAE events. For these NAE events, the guest controls what register state to expose in the GHCB.

## 1.2 Purpose

The purpose of this document is to standardize the GHCB memory area so that a guest OS can interoperate with any hypervisor that supports SEV-ES or SEV-SNP, to standardize on the Non-Automatic Exits that are required to be supported along with the minimum guest state to expose in the GHCB and to standardize on specific actions that might require unique support when running as an SEV-ES or SEV-SNP guest (for example, NMI handling, SMP booting, etc.).

## 2 Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB)

The GHCB must be mapped decrypted by the guest so that the guest and the hypervisor can communicate. For that reason, the GHCB is defined to be 4,096 bytes (4 KB) in size so that it can be contained in a single decrypted page. The format of the GHCB attempts to mirror the SEV-ES VMCB save state area as documented in the [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Appendix B, Table B-4 (this information is represented in [Table 3](#) within this document) through offset 0x3ff. The SEV-ES VMCB save state area extends the traditional VMCB save state area to include additional guest state information. By using this format, hypervisors that support SEV-ES can map the VMCB save state area to the GHCB and limit the number of changes required to support interacting with an SEV-ES guest. However, the GHCB and the SEV-ES save state area can diverge. Not all data from the VMCB save state area will be required by the hypervisor, so this document proposes the required VMCB save state information that is to be provided in the GHCB during a VMGEXIT. For brevity, only the fields of the GHCB that are used will be listed. By providing only the information required for the hypervisor to successfully handle the VMGEXIT, the amount of guest state exposed to the hypervisor is limited.

SEV-SNP requires the introduction of a new GHCB protocol version. To allow for enhancements or changes to the SEV-ES GHCB protocol without requiring SEV-SNP support to be implemented, hypervisor feature support has been added.

### 2.1 Changes for Version 2

Version 2 includes enhancements and additions to the SEV-ES support, along with the initial support for SEV-SNP. Version 2 also introduces hypervisor feature advertisement that allows the hypervisor to advertise its SEV-ES and SEV-SNP support to the guest. This can be useful to allow a hypervisor to support future enhancements without requiring support for all prior features. Not all features are optional; there is a minimum set of features required to be implemented in Version 2 (see [2.2 Hypervisor Feature Support](#)).

In addition to hypervisor feature advertisement, version 2 provides:

- SEV-ES enhancements:
  - GHCB Format Version 2:
    - The addition of the XSS MSR value (if supported) when CPUID 0xd is requested.
    - The shared area specified in the GHCB SW\_SCRATCH field must reside in the GHCB SharedBuffer area of the GHCB.
  - MSR protocol support for AP reset hold.
- SEV-SNP support:
  - GHCB GPA registration
  - Page state updates
  - Guest firmware commands

- AP (vCPU) creation from within the guest
- Restricted interrupt/exception injection
- Restricted APIC emulation (IPI and timer support)

### **2.1.1 Changes for Revision 2.01**

Revision 2.01 updates the SEV-SNP Secrets Page Guest Reserved Area to account for a change from 32-bit to 64-bit guest request message sequence numbers. The location for the high-order 32 bits of the guest request message sequence numbers will be taken from the reserved area.

#### **2.1.1.1 Document Additions**

A new error code is documented for VMGEXIT processing. A hypervisor may return this error code for invalid or malformed GHCB input, regardless of version negotiation or support, as a VMGEXIT failure caused by guest input is a guest kernel bug, and properly hardened guests should interpret any unexpected error code as a fatal error. A VMGEXIT issued from guest-user space results in a “don’t care.”

### **2.1.2 Changes for Revision 2.02**

Revision 2.02 adds the GUID definition for the Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) certificate.

#### **2.1.2.1 Document Additions**

The SNP Guest Request and SNP Extended Guest Request have been updated to expand on the use of the SW\_EXITINFO2 return value to better allow for the hypervisor to return error codes. A hypervisor may return non-zero error codes in the upper-32 bits of SW\_EXITINFO2 regardless of version negotiation or support, as a properly hardened guest should interpret any non-zero value for SW\_EXITINFO2 as an error and handle appropriately.

### **2.1.3 Changes for Revision 2.03**

Revision 2.03 introduces support for retrieving the guest APIC ID list and for running multiple VMPL levels. A new GHCB MSR protocol function and two new GHCB NAE events are introduced. The support for these new actions will be advertised in the Hypervisor Feature bitmap.

Revision 2.03 also introduces support for allowing an SEV-ES guest to notify the hypervisor of a page state change. The support for this new action will be advertised in the Hypervisor Feature bitmap.

#### **2.1.3.1 Document Additions**

Document the SEV-SNP Confidential Computing Blob EFI Protocol used to communicate the SEV-SNP Secrets Page and SEV-SNP CPUID Page from the firmware to the OS.

## **2.1.4 Changes for Revision 2.04**

Revision 2.04 introduces support for SEV trusted IO (SEV-TIO). SEV-TIO allows for passing through trusted PCIe devices with TDISP support to SEV-SNP guests.

Revision 2.04 also introduces support for Secure AVIC. Initial support allows a guest to notify a hypervisor of a vCPU's Secure AVIC guest APIC backing page.

Revision 2.04 also introduces support for a new GHCB MSR protocol function to allow the guest to request the GHCB GPA be unregistered.

### **2.1.4.1 Document Additions**

Document the SEV-TIO Guest Request Protocol used to communicate the SEV-TIO device measurements, certificates and SPDm attestation reports to the guest and provide the guest with a means to enable the device functionality if it is determined that it can be trusted.

Document changes in hardware debug support in an SEV-ES guest.

Document changes specifying the expected behavior of the hypervisor when it receives a GHCB MSR protocol function that it does not support.

Document specifies the GUID format used in SNP Extended Guest Request and SNP TIO Guest Request.

## **2.2 Hypervisor Feature Support**

Version 2 of the specification introduces advertisement of features that are supported by the hypervisor. Support for this specification in full is mandatory unless identified as optional through the feature advertisement support. Note: Some features may have a dependency on other features.

The feature support will be identified through a bitmap, FEATURES, that can be requested by the guest. Each bit will represent an optional feature. To allow for the FEATURES bitmap to be returned before a GHCB has been established, the FEATURES bitmap is limited to 52 bits in size so that it can be returned as part of the GHCB MSR protocol.

The following features are defined:

**Table 1: FEATURES Bitmap**

Bit Position	Feature Name	Feature Details
0	SEV-SNP	Support provided for base SEV-SNP support: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preferred GHCB GPA MSR Protocol</li> <li>• Register GHCB GPA MSR Protocol</li> <li>• SNP Page State Change MSR Protocol</li> <li>• SNP Page State Change NAE Event</li> <li>• SNP Guest Request NAE Event</li> <li>• SNP Extended Guest Request NAE Event</li> </ul>
1	SEV-SNP AP Creation	Support provided for SEV-SNP guest AP VMSA creation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SNP AP Create NAE Event</li> </ul> Requires SEV-SNP Feature.
2	SEV-SNP Restricted Injection	Support provided for SEV-SNP Restricted Injection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SNP #HV Doorbell Page</li> <li>• SNP #HV IPI</li> </ul> Requires SEV-SNP Requires SEV-SNP AP Creation
3	SEV-SNP Restricted Injection Timer	Support provided for SEV-SNP Restricted Injection Timer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SNP #HV Timer NAE Event</li> </ul> Requires SEV-SNP Requires SEV-SNP AP Creation Requires SEV-SNP Restricted Injection
4	APIC ID List	Support provided to return the list of APIC IDs associated with the guest vCPUs.
5	SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL	Support provided for running a vCPU at different VMPL levels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SNP Run VMPL MSR Protocol Request/Response</li> <li>• SNP Run VMPL NAE Event</li> </ul> Requires SEV-SNP Requires SEV-SNP AP Creation
6	SEV-ES Page State Change Support	Support for additionally allowing SEV-ES guests to use the Page State Change protocols (MSR and NAE Event).
7	SEV-TIO Support	Support for additionally allowing SEV-SNP use of trusted IO devices (TDISP).
8	GHCB Unregister Support	Support for unregistering the currently registered GHCB GPA.

## 2.3 Establishing the GHCB

The GHCB location in the guest physical address space is specified by the guest. This location is made available to the hypervisor by mapping the memory as decrypted, or shared, allowing the hypervisor direct access to the memory.

The guest physical address of the GHCB is saved and restored by hardware on VMRUN/VMEXIT through the VMCB (offset 0xa0). The guest can read and write the GHCB value through MSR 0xc001\_0130. The hypervisor must not intercept access to MSR 0xc001\_0130; otherwise, the guest will not be able to successfully establish the GHCB. The GHCB address must be 4K (page) aligned, allowing the 12 LSB bits of the GHCB address to be used for providing or requesting information between the hypervisor and the guest related to the GHCB and SEV-ES, referred to as the GHCB MSR protocol.

### 2.3.1 GHCB MSR Protocol

The GHCB MSR protocol is valid at any time but is most useful when the GHCB page cannot be written by the guest in an unencrypted fashion.

The GHCB MSR protocol uses the lower 12 bits of the GHCB MSR to request an action from the hypervisor. A guest must use only request values documented as guest source values. Using any value that is not a guest request value must be interpreted by a hypervisor as an invalid request and a hypervisor should return to the guest without modifying the GHCB MSR value. For valid requests, a hypervisor must reply to the guest only with response values documented as hypervisor source values. Using any value that is not a hypervisor response value must be interpreted by the guest as an invalid response.

**Table 2: GHCB Address Destination**

Field Name	Bit Position	Definition	Source	Supported Versions
GHCBInfo	11:0	0x000 – GHCB Guest Physical Address	Guest	All
		0x001 – SEV Information	Hypervisor	All
		0x002 – SEV Information Request	Guest	All
		0x004 – CPUID Request	Guest	All
		0x005 – CPUID Response	Hypervisor	All
		0x006 – AP Reset Hold Request	Guest	2+
		0x007 – AP Reset Hold Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x010 – Preferred GHCB GPA Request	Guest	2+
		0x011 – Preferred GHCB GPA Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x012 – Register GHCB GPA Request	Guest	2+



		0x013 – Register GHCB GPA Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x014 – Page State Change Request	Guest	2+
		0x015 – Page State Change Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x016 – SNP Run VMPL Request	Guest	2+
		0x017 – SNP Run VMPL Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x018 – Unregister GHCB GPA Request	Guest	2+
		0x019 – Unregister GHCB GPA Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x080 – Hypervisor Feature Support Request	Guest	2+
		0x081 – Hypervisor Feature Support Response	Hypervisor	2+
		0x100 – Termination Request	Guest	All
GHCBData	63:12	Value dependent upon GHCBInfo		

- GHCBInfo:
  - 0x000 – GHCB Guest Physical Address
    - GHCBData[63:12] specifies bits [63:12] of the guest physical address of the GHCB. (This implies that the GHCB must be 4K aligned.)
  - 0x001 – SEV Information
    - GHCBData[63:48] specifies the maximum GHCB protocol version supported.
    - GHCBData[47:32] specifies the minimum GHCB protocol version supported.
    - GHCBData[31:24] specifies the SEV page table encryption bit number.

Written by the hypervisor before the GHCB address is established (such as on vCPU creation) to present the guest with the hypervisor’s capabilities. The guest will choose an appropriate version within the range supplied by the hypervisor and set the GHCB Protocol Version field. If the guest cannot support the protocol range supplied by the hypervisor, it should terminate.

The SEV page table encryption bit number is required by the guest when building the page tables before entering long mode. Normally, the SEV page table encryption bit number is obtained using the CPUID instruction, which will now result in a VMM Communication exception. Without knowing the position of the encryption bit, the GHCB page cannot be marked as decrypted to allow for communication with the hypervisor. Because of this, the hypervisor must supply the page table encryption bit number to the guest. This value can be obtained by the hypervisor from CPUID function 0x8000\_001f, register EBX[5:0]. Alternatively, for CPUID instructions that are required before the GHCB can be established, the guest can use the CPUID request protocol documented below and is recommended for an SEV-SNP guest.

- 0x002 – SEV Information Request
  - Written by the guest to request the hypervisor provide the SEV information (GHCBInfo = 0x001) needed to perform protocol negotiation.
- 0x004 – CPUID Request
  - GHCBData[63:32] – CPUID function
  - GHCBData[31:30] – Requested CPUID register value
    - 0b00 – EAX
    - 0b01 – EBX
    - 0b10 – ECX
    - 0b11 – EDX
  - GHCBData[29:12] – Reserved, must be zero

Written by the guest to request a CPUID function register value from the hypervisor. This is useful if CPUID information is required before the GHCB can be established by the guest. Because only a single register value can be returned at a time, multiple VMGEXIT invocations are required to obtain all register values.

The CPUID request protocol does not support CPUID functions that require non-zero sub-leafs. Additionally, CPUID function 0x0000\_000d is not supported as it requires the value of XCR0.

- 0x005 – CPUID Response
  - GHCBData[63:32] – CPUID function register value
  - GHCBData[31:30] – Returned CPUID register value
    - 0b00 – EAX
    - 0b01 – EBX
    - 0b10 – ECX
    - 0b11 – EDX
  - GHCBData[29:12] – Reserved, must be zero

Written by the hypervisor in response to a CPUID request to return the requested CPUID function register value.

- 0x006 – AP Reset Hold Request
  - GHCBData[63:12] – MBZ

Written by the guest to request the AP be placed in an HLT loop awaiting an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request. This allows an AP to request AP reset hold without having to be in long mode. See [4.3.1 SEV-ES and SEV-SNP](#) for a description of the AP reset hold NAE event.

Not valid for an SEV-SNP guest running with the Restricted Injection feature. A hypervisor should treat this as an unsupported request in this situation.

○ 0x007 – AP Reset Hold Response

- GHCBData[63:12] – Must be non-zero

Written by the hypervisor after an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence has been received for the targeted AP to take it out of HLT. See [4.3.1 SEV-ES and SEV-SNP](#) for a description of the AP reset hold NAE event.

○ 0x010 – Preferred GHCB GPA Request

- GHCBData[63:12] – Must be zero

Written by the guest to request the GHCB guest physical address (GHCB GPA) that the hypervisor prefers to be used for the vCPU invoking the VMGEXIT. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions.

○ 0x011 – Preferred GHCB GPA Response

- GHCBData[63:12] – Preferred GHCB GFN

Written by the hypervisor in response to a preferred GHCB GPA request. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions.

○ 0x012 – Register GHCB GPA Request

- GHCBData[63:12] – GHCB GFN to register

Written by the guest to request the GHCB guest physical address (GHCB GPA = GHCB GFN << 12) be registered for the vCPU invoking the VMGEXIT. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions.

○ 0x013 – Register GHCB GPA Response

- GHCBData[63:12] – Registered GHCB GFN

Written by the hypervisor in response to a register GHCB GPA request. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions.

○ 0x014 – Page State Change Request

- GHCBData[63:56] – Reserved, must be zero
- GHCBData[55:52] – Page operation
  - 0x0001 – Page assignment, Private
  - 0x0002 – Page assignment, Shared

- GHCBData[51:12] – Guest physical frame number  
Written by the guest to request a page state change from the hypervisor based on the operation requested. The page will be acted on as a 4K page. The page state change will be against the system physical address (SPA) that is used to back the guest physical address (GPA) calculated from the supplied guest physical frame number (GFN) for the requested page size. Support of this protocol for an SEV-ES guest is based on the Page State Change Support for SEV-ES feature bit. See [4.1.6 Page State Change](#) for a description of the page operations.
- 0x015 – Page State Change Response
  - GHCBData[63:32] – Error code
  - GHCBData[31:12] – Reserved, must be zero  
Written by the hypervisor in response to a Page State Change request. Any non-zero value for the error code indicates that the page state change was not successful.
- 0x016 – SNP Run VMPL Request
  - GHCBData[63:40] – Reserved, must be zero
  - GHCBData[39:32] – VMPL level to run
  - GHCBData[31:12] – Reserved, must be zero  
Written by the guest to request the hypervisor to run the vCPU using the VMSA associated with the request VMPL level. See [4.1.14 SNP Run VMPL](#). Availability is based on the SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL hypervisor feature bit.
- 0x017 – SNP Run VMPL Response
  - GHCBData[63:32] – Error code
  - GHCBData[31:12] – Reserved, must be zero  
Written by the hypervisor in response to a Run VMPL request. Any non-zero value for the error code indicates that the hypervisor was unable to run the vCPU at the requested VMPL level.
- 0x018 – Unregister GHCB GPA Request
  - GHCBData[63:12] – Reserved, must be zero  
Written by the guest to request the currently registered GHCB guest physical address be unregistered for the vCPU invoking the VMGEXIT. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions. Availability is based on the GHCB Unregister Support hypervisor feature bit.
- 0x019 – Unregister GHCB GPA Response

- GHCBData[63:12] – Unregistered GHCB GFN  
Written by the hypervisor in response to an unregister GHCB GPA request. See [2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration](#) for further details and restrictions.
- 0x080 – Hypervisor Feature Support Request
  - GHCBData[63:12] – Reserved, must be zero  
Written by the guest to request the hypervisor feature support bitmap.
- 0x081 – Hypervisor Feature Support Response
  - GHCBData[63:12] – FEATURES bitmap  
Written by the hypervisor in response to a Hypervisor Feature Support request. See [2.2 Hypervisor Feature Support](#).
- 0x100 – Termination Request
  - Written by the guest to communicate to the hypervisor that the guest is requesting termination. The guest should expect the hypervisor to comply with the request for termination. As a safeguard, it is recommended that the guest incorporate an HLT loop or SHUTDOWN following the VMGEXIT. GHCBData contains the termination reason code where GHCBData[15:12] specifies the reason code set and GHCBData[23:16] contains the reason code from that reason code set.  
  
The reason code set is meant to provide hypervisors with their own termination reason codes. This document defines and owns reason code set 0x0 and the following reason codes (GHCBData[23:16]):
    - 0x00 – General termination request
    - 0x01 – SEV-ES/GHCB Protocol range is not supported.
    - 0x02 – SEV-SNP features not supported

### 2.3.2 GHCB GPA Registration

GHCB GPA registration is only supported and required for SEV-SNP guests. Some hypervisors may prefer that a guest use a consistent and/or specific GPA for the GHCB associated with a vCPU. Therefore, a guest must use the Register GHCB GPA request MSR protocol function to establish the GHCB GPA before using a GHCB for a VMGEXIT for the first time.

The registration request allows for two actions to be performed.

- Get preferred GHCB GPA

A guest may request the hypervisor-preferred GHCB GPA for the vCPU by setting GHCBData to 0 and GHCBInfo to 0x10. The hypervisor must respond with a GFN or

0xf\_ffff\_ffff\_ffff (the hypervisor does not have a preferred GHCB GPA) in GHCBData and 0x11 in GHCBInfo. If the hypervisor responds with a GFN, the hypervisor must guarantee that the value cannot otherwise be mapped by the guest. For an SEV-SNP guest, the hypervisor must update the RMP table to make the page a hypervisor-owned (shared) page. The guest is not required to use the preferred GHCB GPA, but should the guest decide to use it, it should verify that the new GPA is outside of its known memory range.

- **Register GHCB GPA**

A guest must register a vCPU GHCB GPA before using it for the first time. If the guest is not using the hypervisor-preferred GHCB GPA, the guest must make the GHCB page a hypervisor-owned (shared) page. Registration is performed by setting GHCBData to the GFN of GHCB GPA (which could be the hypervisor-preferred value) and GHCBInfo to 0x12. The hypervisor must respond with the same GFN value or 0xf\_ffff\_ffff\_ffff (the hypervisor does not accept the supplied GHCB GPA) in GHCBData and 0x13 in GHCBInfo.

Registering a GHCB GPA automatically unregisters any currently registered GHCB GPA.

A hypervisor must terminate the guest if the guest supplies a GHCB GPA that does not match the currently registered version of the GHCB GPA for the vCPU.

If the hypervisor advertises the SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL hypervisor feature, it must allow for each VMPL level to register a GHCB GPA.

The guest may request that the currently registered GHCB GPA be unregistered. Using the Unregister GHCB GPA Request MSR protocol function, the guest can inform the hypervisor that the currently registered GHCB will no longer be used. This allows the hypervisor to perform any cleanup that may be needed.

- **Unregister GHCB GPA**

A guest may unregister the currently registered GHCB GPA for the vCPU. Unregistration is performed by setting GHCBData to 0 and GHCBInfo to 0x18. The hypervisor must respond with either the GFN value that was unregistered, 0 (there was no currently registered GHCB GPA), or 0xf\_ffff\_ffff\_ffff (the unregistration failed) in GHCBData and 0x19 in GHCBInfo.

## **2.4 GHCB Negotiation Example**

The guest will ultimately provide the GPA of the GHCB page via the GHCB MSR. The hypervisor will obtain this GPA value by reading offset 0x00a0 of the VMCB. Initially, however, the hypervisor can set the GHCB MSR to allow for the GHCB protocol to be negotiated. This example assumes that the hypervisor performs its current steps when preparing to create and start a vCPU and that use of the CPUID instruction is intercepted. The following additional steps document an example for the GHCB negotiation.

### 2.4.1 SEV-ES (Version 1)

- Hypervisor sets VMCB offset 0x00a0 before launching the vCPU for the first time:
  - The value is used by the guest to negotiate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol version and establish the page table encryption bit.
  - Given that the hypervisor supports only version 1 and the SEV page table encryption bit number is 47 (0x2f), the hypervisor will use GHCBInfo value of 0x001 and set VMCB offset 0x00a0 to:
    - 0x0001\_0001\_2f00\_0001
- Hypervisor launches the guest vCPU (VMRUN).
- Guest determines the encryption bit position to properly set up the page tables and mark the GHCB as shared.
  - Guest establishes an exception handler for #VC exceptions.
    - Guest will perform a series of CPUID instructions to obtain the SEV data. For an SEV-ES guest, these CPUID instructions result in a #VC exception, where the CPUID instructions will be emulated.
  - Guest issues CPUID for leaf 0x80000000:
    - EAX is set to 0x8000001f
    - #VC handler returns.
  - Guest issues CPUID for leaf 0x8000001f:
    - Guest #VC exception handler reads MSR 0xc001\_0130
    - If GHCBInfo != 0x001:
      - Guest requests termination.
    - Guest extracts the maximum GHCB protocol version, GHCBData[63:48], and minimum GHCB protocol version, GHCBData[47:32]. If the guest cannot support a protocol in the range:
      - Guest requests termination.
    - Guest extracts the SEV page table encryption bit number, GHCBData[31:24].
    - EAX is set to 0x0000000a
      - SEV and SEV-ES supported
    - EBX is set to the SEV page table encryption bit.
    - #VC handler returns.
- Guest continues initialization, which, among other things, includes:

- Ensuring that 64-bit long mode is established
- Page tables are configured with the encryption bit as required.
- GHCB page is allocated and marked shared in the page tables:
  - Guest writes MSR 0xc001\_0130 with the GPA of the allocated GHCB page (GHCBInfo == 0x000).
  - Must be done before a VMGEXIT instruction is issued that uses the GHCB page

The above example is just one way to perform the GHCB negotiation for an SEV-ES guest. For example, you could use the GHCBInfo = 0x004 CPUID Request to obtain actual values for the CPUID instructions executed by the guest. Or you could use the GHCBInfo = 0x002 Request for SEV Information if MSR 0xc001\_0130 does not contain the GHCBInfo = 0x001 SEV Information.

## 2.4.2 SEV-SNP (Version 2)

The hypervisor may supply the encryption bit position using the SEV Information MSR protocol, but the guest should use the CPUID information supplied in the CPUID Page to determine the encryption bit position. The information in the CPUID Page will have been validated by the SEV firmware.

- Hypervisor sets VMCB offset 0x00a0 before launching the vCPU for the first time:
  - The value is used by the guest to negotiate the SEV-ES/GHCB protocol version and establish the page table encryption bit.
  - Given that the hypervisor supports up to version 2 and the SEV page table encryption bit number is 51 (0x33), the hypervisor will use GHCBInfo value of 0x001 and set VMCB offset 0x00a0 to:
    - 0x0002\_0001\_3300\_0001
- Hypervisor launches the guest vCPU (VMRUN).
- Guest determines the encryption bit position to properly set up page tables and mark the GHCB as shared.
  - Guest establishes an exception handler for #VC exceptions.
    - Guest will perform a series of CPUID instructions to obtain the SEV data. For an SEV-SNP guest, these CPUID instructions result in a #VC exception, where the CPUID instructions will be emulated by setting register values to the values set in the CPUID Page.
  - Guest issues CPUID for leaf 0x80000000:
    - #VC exception handler sets EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX for leaf 0x80000000



- #VC exception handler returns.
- Guest verifies that EAX is at least 0x8000001f
- Guest issues RDMSR for MSR 0xc001\_0131 (non-interceptable SEV Status MSR).
  - Guest verifies that it is running as an SEV-SNP guest by verifying that  $EAX[2:0] == 0x7$
- Guest issues CPUID for leaf 0x8000001f:
  - #VC exception handler sets EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX for leaf 0x8000001f
  - #VC exception handler returns.
  - Guest extracts the SEV page table encryption bit position, EBX[5:0]
- Guest uses the MSR Protocol support to issue an SEV Information Request:
  - Guest extracts the maximum GHCB protocol version, GHCBData[63:48], and minimum GHCB protocol version, GHCBData[47:32]. If the guest cannot support a protocol in the range:
    - Guest requests termination.
- Guest continues initialization, which, among other things, includes:
  - Ensuring that 64-bit long mode is established
  - Page tables are configured with the encryption bit as required.
  - GHCB page is allocated and marked shared in the page tables:
    - Guest uses MSR Protocol to perform Register GHCB GPA Request using the GFN of the allocated GHCB page. If the hypervisor does not respond with the input GFN:
      - Guest requests termination.
    - Guest writes MSR 0xc001\_0130 with the GPA of the allocated GHCB page (GHCBInfo == 0x000)
    - Must be done before a VMGEXIT instruction is issued that uses the GHCB page.

The above example is just one way to perform the GHCB negotiation for an SEV-SNP guest.

## 2.5 GHCB/VMGEXIT Example

The following shows an example of a guest and hypervisor that conform to version 1 of the GHCB protocol:

- Guest executes an instruction resulting in a #VC exception
  - Guest #VC handler is invoked

- Guest #VC handler disables preemption and interrupts
- Guest #VC handler ensures that the physical address of the GHCB is set in MSR 0xc001\_0130
- Guest #VC handler clears any previous GHCB field invocation data
- Guest #VC handler sets the GHCB fields as required for the instruction
- Guest #VC handler issues VMGEXIT
- Hypervisor resumes with a VMEXIT code of VMEXIT\_VMGEXIT
  - Hypervisor reads VMCB offset 0x00a0 to obtain the guest physical address of the GHCB
  - If GHCBInfo == 0x000
    - Hypervisor translates GHCB guest physical address into a GHCB hypervisor virtual address, handles the exit based on the GHCB SW\_EXITCODE, updates the GHCB save state area and resumes the guest.
  - If GHCBInfo == 0x002
    - Hypervisor recreates the GHCB protocol versioning value, sets this value in the VMCB at offset 0x00a0 and resumes the guest.
  - If GHCBInfo == 0x004
    - Hypervisor creates a CPUID response to the CPUID request, sets this value in the VMCB at offset 0x00a0 and resumes the guest.
  - If GHCBInfo == 0x100
    - Hypervisor terminates the guest, optionally displaying the associated GHCBData value.
  - If GHCBInfo is any other value
    - Hypervisor will be unable to process the VMGEXIT and should terminate the guest.
- Guest #VC handler resumes processing
  - Guest copies the GHCB save state information to the guest register state
  - Guest enables interrupts and preemption
  - Guest exits the #VC handler

When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is important not to do anything that would result in an unplanned NAE event before entering long mode or 32-bit PAE. When not in one of these modes, all memory accesses by the guest are forced to use encryption under the key associated with the guest. As a result, the guest and hypervisor would not be able to communicate through the GHCB because the hypervisor would see encrypted data. The guest should determine encryption bit position so that the GHCB can be properly established. One way to perform this would be:

- Issue CPUID for function 0x8000\_0000 and verify CPUID function 0x8000\_001f is available.

- If the CPUID instruction is being intercepted, this will result in a #VC, where the CPUID exchange protocol can be used to obtain the CPUID results.
- Issue CPUID for function 0x8000\_001f and obtain the encryption bit position.
- If the CPUID instruction is being intercepted, this will result in a #VC, where the CPUID exchange protocol can be used to obtain the CPUID results.

This is not the only way this can be done. If a #VC is encountered, then software would know that it is running as an SEV-ES guest and could use GHCBInfo 0x002 to request the SEV information to obtain the encryption bit position.

## 2.6 GHCB Layout

**Table 3: GHCB Layout**

Offset	Size	Contents	Notes	Supported Versions
0x0000	0xcb	RESERVED		
0x00cb	0x01	CPL		All
0x00cc	0x74	RESERVED		
0x0140	0x08	XSS		2+
0x0148	0x18	RESERVED		
0x0160	0x08	DR7		All
0x0168	0x90	RESERVED		
0x01f8	0x08	RAX		All
0x0200	0x100	RESERVED		
0x0300	0x08	RESERVED (RAX already available at 0x01f8)		
0x0308	0x08	RCX		All
0x0310	0x08	RDX		All
0x0318	0x08	RBX		All
0x0320	0x70	RESERVED		
0x0390	0x08	SW_EXITCODE	Guest controlled exit code	All
0x0398	0x08	SW_EXITINFO1	Guest controlled exit information 1	All
0x03a0	0x08	SW_EXITINFO2	Guest controlled exit information 2	All
0x03a8	0x08	SW_SCRATCH	Guest controlled additional information	All
0x03b0	0x38	RESERVED		
0x03e8	0x08	XCR0		All



## SEV-ES Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization

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Offset	Size	Contents	Notes	Supported Versions
0x03f0	0x10	VALID_BITMAP	Bitmap to indicate valid qwords in the save state area starting from offset 0x000 through offset 0x3ef (126 qwords)	All
0x0400	0x08	X87_STATE_GPA	Guest physical address of a page containing X87 related state information conforming to the format produced by the XSAVE instruction.	All
0x0408	0x3f8	RESERVED		
0x0800	0x7f0	RESERVED / Shared Buffer	Can be used as a shared buffer area. Future versions of the GHCB specification will not alter this area definition.	All
0x0ff0	0x0a	RESERVED		
0x0ffa	0x02	SEV-ES/GHCB Protocol Version	Version of the SEV-ES/GHCB layout used by the guest <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0x0001 – SEV-ES/GHCB Protocol Version 1</li> <li>0x0002 – SEV-ES/GHCB Protocol Version 2</li> </ul>	All
0x0ffc	0x04	GHCB Usage	Provides an indicator of the usage and format of the GHCB: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>0x00000000 – The GHCB page follows the format as documented here</li> <li>Any other value can be used by the hypervisor, which can determine its own format (e.g. for hypercall usage)</li> </ul> <p>On VMGEXIT, the hypervisor should check the GHCB Usage field and validate that is a supported value. A hypervisor must support the GHCB Usage value 0x0000 and may support other values. For any unsupported value, the hypervisor can either terminate the guest or resume the guest indicating an exception should be raised.</p> <p>Details of how hypervisors communicate support for additional GHCB Usage values is beyond the scope of this document.</p>	All

## 2.7 SEV-SNP Secrets Page

The hypervisor should supply an SEV-SNP guest with a secrets page as part of the SEV-SNP launch process (see [SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification](#)). Within the SNP secrets page, there is a 96-byte area from offset 0x00a0 to 0x00ff reserved for use by the SEV-SNP guest.

The Secrets Page Guest Reserved Area can be used to communicate information between operating environments (e.g., when transferring control from UEFI to the OS). To avoid usage conflicts, the format and use of this area is defined in [Table 4](#).

- Changes for Revision 2.01:
  - A change to the SEV-SNP API after finalization of version 2.00 changed the guest request message sequence number from 32 bits to 64 bits. As a result, a backward-compatible update has been made to the Secrets Page Guest Reserved Area format by using 18 bytes of the 40 reserved (must be zero) bytes to hold the upper 32 bits of the now 64-bit guest request message sequence numbers and a 16-bit version number.

**Table 4: Secrets Page Guest Reserved Area**

Offset	Size	Contents	Supported Revisions
0x0000	0x04	VMPL0 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [31:0]	2+
0x0004	0x04	VMPL1 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [31:0]	2+
0x0008	0x04	VMPL2 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [31:0]	2+
0x000c	0x04	VMPL3 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [31:0]	2+
0x0010	0x08	AP Jump Table Physical Address	2+
0x0018	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2
	0x04	VMPL0 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [63:32]	2.01+
0x001c	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2
	0x04	VMPL1 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [63:32]	2.01+
0x0020	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2
	0x04	VMPL2 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [63:32]	2.01+
0x0024	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2
	0x04	VMPL3 Current Guest Message Sequence Number [63:32]	2.01+
0x0028	0x16	RESERVED – MBZ	2+
0x003e	0x02	RESERVED – MBZ	2
	0x02	Version: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 – Revision 2.01</li> </ul>	2.01



Offset	Size	Contents	Supported Revisions
0x0040	0x20	Guest Usage	2+

The VMPL Current Guest Request Message Sequence Number fields allow for communicating the current message sequence numbers between operating environments so that the next environment can successfully issue guest requests.

The physical address field of the AP Jump Table allows for communicating the physical address between operating environments without hypervisor involvement.

The Guest Usage area is for use by the guest in any manner desired.

The format of the area is:

```
struct secrets_page_os_area {
    uint32 vmpl0_message_seq_num;
    uint32 vmpl1_message_seq_num;
    uint32 vmpl2_message_seq_num;
    uint32 vmpl3_message_seq_num;

    uint64 ap_jump_table_pa;

    union {

        /* Revision 2.00 */
        uint8 reserved1[40];

        /* Revision 2.01 */
        struct {
            uint32 vmpl0_message_seq_num_hi;
            uint32 vmpl1_message_seq_num_hi;
            uint32 vmpl2_message_seq_num_hi;
            uint32 vmpl3_message_seq_num_hi;
            uint8 reserved2[22];
            uint16 version; /* == 1 */
        };

    };

    uint8 guest_usage[32];
};
```

## 2.8 SEV-SNP Confidential Computing Blob EFI Protocol

The hypervisor should supply an SEV-SNP guest with a secrets page and a CPUID page as part of the SEV-SNP launch process (see [SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification](#)). When an EFI platform is used, the firmware can communicate these pages to the OS using an EFI configuration table.

The EFI SEV-SNP Confidential Computing Blob configuration table GUID is:

```
{0x067b1f5f, 0xcf26, 0x44c5, {0x85, 0x54, 0x93, 0xd7, 0x77, 0x91, 0x2d, 0x42}}
```

The format of the EFI SEV-SNP Confidential Computing Blob configuration table is defined in [Table 5](#).

**Table 5: EFI SNP Confidential Computing Blob Configuration Table**

Offset	Size	Contents	Supported Revisions
0x0000	0x04	Header/signature • 0x45444d41 – Revision 2.00	2+
0x0004	0x02	Version: • 1 – Revision 2.00	2+
0x0006	0x02	RESERVED – MBZ	2+
0x0008	0x08	Secrets Page Physical Address	2+
0x0010	0x04	Secrets Page Size	2+
0x0014	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2+
0x0018	0x08	CPUID Page Physical Address	2+
0x0020	0x04	CPUID Page Size	2+
0x0024	0x04	RESERVED – MBZ	2+

```
struct snp_confidential_computing_blob_efi_config_table {
    uint32 header; /* == 0x45444d41 */
    uint16 version; /* == 1 */
    uint16 reserved1;
    uint64 secrets_page_physical_address;
    uint32 secrets_page_size;
    uint32 reserved2;
    uint64 cpuid_page_physical_address;
    uint32 cpuid_page_size;
    uint32 reserved3;
};
```

## 3 Guest Exits

### 3.1 Automatic Exits (AE)

**Table 6: List of Automatic Exits**

Code	Name	Description
0x52	VMEXIT_MC	Machine check exception
0x60	VMEXIT_INTR	Physical interrupt
0x61	VMEXIT_NMI	Physical NMI
0x63	VMEXIT_INIT	Physical INIT
0x64	VMEXIT_VINTR	Virtual INTR
0x77	VMEXIT_PAUSE	PAUSE instruction
0x78	VMEXIT_HLT	HLT instruction
0x7F	VMEXIT_SHUTDOWN	Shutdown
0x8f	VMEXIT_EFER_WRITE_TRAP	
0x90 – 0x9f	VMEXIT_CR[0-15]_WRITE_TRAP	
0x400	VMEXIT_NPF	Only if PFCODE[3] == 0 (no reserved bit error)
0x403	VMEXIT_VMGEXIT	VMGEXIT instruction
-1	VMEXIT_INVALID	Invalid guest state
-2	VMEXIT_BUSY	Busy bit was set in guest state

Refer to [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Section 15.35.4 for information on how the guest RIP is advanced when an AE exit is encountered.

### 3.2 Guest Non-Automatic Exits (NAE)

NAE events are all exit events that are not AE events. When an NAE event occurs, the VMM Communication Exception (#VC) is always thrown by the hardware when an SEV-ES guest is running. The error code of the #VC exception is equal to the VMEXIT code of the event that caused the NAE.



The guest should inspect the error code to determine the cause of the exception, decide what register state needs to be copied to the GHCB, and then invoke the VMGEXIT instruction to generate an AE event. After a subsequent VMRUN instruction by the hypervisor, the guest will resume at the next instruction following the VMGEXIT instruction. This provides the guest an opportunity to examine the results provided from the hypervisor in the GHCB and copy them back to its internal state. The #VC handler exits using the IRET instruction; therefore, the IRET instruction should not be intercepted (with exception for an NMI, which is discussed in a subsequent section).

## 4 GHCB Protocol

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This document will provide the definition for supported versions of the GHCB protocol that will establish guest and hypervisor requirements. This will consist of the list of required NAE events that the guest and the hypervisor must support, as well as the required guest state that will be provided by the guest and returned by the hypervisor during a VMGEXIT. In general, the SW\_EXITCODE will map to the SVM intercept exit codes. There are some exceptions where a user-defined SW\_EXITCODE will be used to provide additional needed information to the hypervisor.

The following table lists the NAE events that are valid for GHCB protocol, along with the version associated. A hypervisor is not required to intercept the instructions that generate all the listed NAE events, but because a guest can invoke VMGEXIT without having taken a #VC, the hypervisor must be able to handle a VMGEXIT from the guest for the listed NAE events. The hypervisor can decide if the VMGEXIT event is valid and respond appropriately. A guest must be able to handle a #VC exception for all the NAE events listed. It is up to the guest to decide how to handle the NAE event. For example, a guest may decide that it should never receive a particular NAE event and, instead of performing VMGEXIT processing, can perform some alternate processing.

The state to and from the hypervisor in the NAE event table is the minimum state information required. Each GHCB field set by the guest and returned by the hypervisor must have the appropriate bit set in the GHCB VALID\_BITMAP field. At a minimum:

- The guest is expected to set the bits for SW\_EXITCODE, SW\_EXITINFO1 and SW\_EXITINFO2.
- The hypervisor is expected to set the bits for SW\_EXITINFO1 and SW\_EXITINFO2.

Before each NAE event, the guest should reset the VALID\_BITMAP field by clearing all bits before setting the bits associated with the NAE event to be performed. Likewise, the hypervisor should reset the VALID\_BITMAP field before setting the bits associated with the results of the NAE event.

The VALID\_BITMAP bit position is calculated by taking the offset of the field in bytes and dividing by 8, giving the qword offset. Given the qword offset, the byte offset and bit position within the VALID\_BITMAP are calculated. The byte offset is the qword offset divided by 8, while the bit position within the byte offset is the qword offset mod 8. For example:

- RAX is offset 0x01f8,  $0x01f8 / 8 = 0x3f$  or 63
- VALID\_BITMAP byte offset is  $63 / 8 = 7$
- VALID\_BITMAP bit position within the byte offset is  $63 \% 8 = 7$

The guest and hypervisor can supply an additional state if desired but must not rely on it being provided. Unless otherwise specified in the table below, SW\_EXITINFO1 and SW\_EXITINFO2 must be set to 0.

**Table 7: List of Supported Non-Automatic Events**

NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
DR7 Read	SW_EXITCODE = 0x27		See <a href="#">4.5 Debug Register Support</a>	All
DR7 Write	RAX SW_EXITCODE = 0x37 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		See <a href="#">4.5 Debug Register Support</a>  SW_EXITINFO1 will be set as documented in <a href="#">AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming</a> , Section 15.8.1	All
RDTSC	SW_EXITCODE = 0x6e SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	RAX RDX		All
RDPMC	RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x6f SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	RAX RDX		All
CPUID	RAX RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x72 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0 XCR0*	RAX RBX RCX RDX	XCR0 is required to be supplied only when a request for CPUID 0000_000D is made.	1
	RAX RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x72 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0 XCR0* XSS*	RAX RBX RCX RDX	XCR0 is only required to be supplied when a request for CPUID 0000_000D is made.  XSS is only required to be supplied when a request for CPUID 0000_000D is made and the guest supports the XSS MSR (0x0000_0da0).	2+
INVD	SW_EXITCODE = 0x76 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0			All



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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
IOIO_PROT	RAX (for OUT) SW_EXITCODE = 0x7b SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2 SW_SCRATCH = <ADDR>	RAX (for IN)	SW_EXITINFO1 will be set as documented in <a href="#">AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming</a> , Section 15.10.2  If string-based port access is indicated in SW_EXITINFO1, SW_EXITINFO2 will contain the REP count, otherwise 0  If string-based port access is indicated in SW_EXITINFO1, SW_SCRATCH will have the SRC (OUTS) or DST (INS) guest physical address of shared memory  See <a href="#">4.1.2 IOIO_PROT (0x7b)</a>	All
MSR_PROT (RDMSR)	RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x7c SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	RAX RDX	See <a href="#">4.1.3 MSR_PROT (0x7c)</a>	All
MSR_PROT (WRMSR)	RAX RCX RDX SW_EXITCODE = 0x7c SW_EXITINFO1 = 1 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		See <a href="#">4.1.3 MSR_PROT (0x7c)</a>	All
VMMCALL	RAX CPL SW_EXITCODE = 0x81 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	RAX	RAX and CPL are the minimum required state to be provided to the hypervisor.  The guest can supply additional information as required by the hypercall and indicate that in VALID_BITMAP.  See <a href="#">4.1.4 VMMCALL (0x81)</a>	All
RDTSCP	SW_EXITCODE = 0x87 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	RAX RCX RDX		All

NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
WBINVD	SW_EXITCODE = 0x89 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0			All
MONITOR/ MONITORX	RAX RCX RDX SW_EXITCODE = 0x8a SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		RAX will contain the guest physical address of the MONITOR/MONITORX memory range.	All
MWAIT/ MWAITX	RAX RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x8b SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0			All
#AC			The #VC handler should forward this exception on to the #AC handler.	All
#NPF MMIO READ	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0001 SW_EXITINFO1 = <SRC> SW_EXITINFO2 = <LEN> SW_SCRATCH = <DST>		SW_EXITINFO1 will have the SRC guest physical address  SW_EXITINFO2 must be less than or equal to 0x7fff_ffff for version 1 and less than or equal to 0x8 for all other versions.  SW_SCRATCH will have the DST guest physical address of shared memory  See <a href="#">4.1.5 #NPF/MMIO Access</a>	All



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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
#NPF/ MMIO WRITE	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0002 SW_EXITINFO1 = <DST> SW_EXITINFO2 = <LEN> SW_SCRATCH = <SRC>		SW_EXITINFO1 will have the DST guest physical address  SW_EXITINFO2 must be less than or equal to 0x7fff_ffff for version 1 and less than or equal to 0x8 for all other versions.  SW_SCRATCH will have the SRC guest physical address of shared memory  <a href="#">See 4.1.5 #NPF/MMIO Access</a>	All
NMI Complete	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0003 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		<a href="#">See 4.4 Non-maskable Interrupts</a>	All
AP Reset Hold	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0004 SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0	SW_EXITINFO2	SW_EXITINFO2 = <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> 0 - the vCPU did not receive a SIPI request. Non-zero - the vCPU received a SIPI request.  Not valid for an SEV-SNP guest running with the Restricted Injection feature. A hypervisor should treat this as an unsupported NAE event in this situation.  <a href="#">See 4.3.1 SEV-ES and SEV-SNP</a>	All

NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
AP Jump Table	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0005 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2	SW_EXITINFO2	<p>SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 (SET) SW_EXITINFO2 = <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> the guest physical address to be SET <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> 0</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1 = 1 (GET) SW_EXITINFO2 = <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> 0 <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> the guest physical address as previously SET (or zero if not previously SET)</p> <p>Not valid for an SEV-SNP guest. A hypervisor should treat this as an unsupported NAE event in this situation.</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.3.1 SEV-ES and SEV-SNP</a></p>	All
Page State Change	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0010 SW_SCRATCH = <DATA>	SW_EXITINFO2	<p>SW_SCRATCH will have the guest physical address of a Page State Change structure residing in shared memory.</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO2 will contain 0 if all entries have been processed successfully or a reason code identifying why the request has not completed.</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.6 Page State Change</a></p>	2+



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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
SNP Guest Request	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0011 SW_EXITINFO1 = <REQ GPA> SW_EXITINFO2 = <RSP GPA>	SW_EXITINFO2	<p>SW_EXITINFO1 will have the guest physical address of the request page</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO2</p> <p><b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will have the guest physical address of the response page</p> <p><b>State from Hypervisor:</b> Upper 32-bits (63:32) will contain the return code from the hypervisor. Lower 32-bits (31:0) will contain the return code from the firmware call (0 = success)</p> <p>Both the request page and response page must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared).</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.7 SNP Guest Request</a></p>	2+



NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
SNP Extended Guest Request	RAX = <DATA GPA> RBX = <DATA PAGE COUNT> SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0012 SW_EXITINFO1 = <REQ GPA> SW_EXITINFO2 = <RSP GPA>	RBX SW_EXITINFO2	<p>RAX will have the guest physical address of the page(s) to hold returned data</p> <p>RBX  <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will contain the number of guest contiguous pages supplied to hold returned data  <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> on error will contain the number of guest contiguous pages required to hold the data to be returned</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1 will have the guest physical address of the request page</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO2  <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will have the guest physical address of the response page  <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> Upper 32-bits (63:32) will contain the return code from the hypervisor. Lower 32-bits (31:0) will contain the return code from the firmware call (0 = success)</p> <p>The request page, response page and data page(s) must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared).</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.8 SNP Extended Guest Request</a></p>	2+



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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
SNP AP Creation	RAX = <SEV_FEATURES> SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0013 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2		<p>RAX, on <b>CREATE/ADD</b>, will contain the SEV_FEATURES value used in the VMSA specified in SW_EXITINFO2.</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1[63:32] = APIC ID</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1[31:20] = 0</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1[19:16] = VMPL</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1[15:0] =</p> <p><b>0 (CREATE/ADD)</b>            VMSA state for the specified VMPL level to be used with the next INIT-SIPI.</p> <p>Not valid for an SEV-SNP guest running with the Restricted Injection feature. A hypervisor should treat this as an unsupported NAE event in this situation.</p> <p><b>1 (CREATE/ADD)</b>            VMSA state for the specified VMPL level to be used immediately (issue VMRUN).</p> <p><b>2 (DESTROY/REMOVE)</b>            Remove VMSA state for the specified VMPL level (vCPU is no longer runnnable).</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO2 is the guest physical address of the VMSA to be for the vCPU associated with the specified APID ID (0 for a destroy/remove request).</p> <p>Recognition of the VMPL level is based on the SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL hypervisor feature. VMPL must be zero if the hypervisor does not support the SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL feature.</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.9 SNP AP Creation</a> and <a href="#">4.3.2 SEV-SNP (SNP AP Creation Feature)</a></p>	2+

NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
#HV Doorbell Page	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0014 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2	SW_EXITINFO2	<p>SW_EXITINFO1 =</p> <p><b>0 (GET_PREFERRED)</b> SW_EXITINFO2 <b>State from hypervisor:</b> is the hypervisor preferred guest physical address to use for the doorbell page.</p> <p><b>1 (SET)</b> SW_EXITINFO2 <b>State to hypervisor:</b> is the guest physical address to use for the doorbell page.</p> <p><b>2 (QUERY)</b> SW_EXITINFO2 <b>State from hypervisor:</b> is the guest physical address that is in use for the doorbell page.</p> <p><b>3 (CLEAR)</b></p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.10 #HV Doorbell Page</a></p>	2+
#HV IPI	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0015 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		<p>SW_EXITINFO1 will be set to the x2APIC Interrupt Command Register format.</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.11 #HV IPI</a></p>	2+



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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
#HV Timer	RAX RBX RCX SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0016 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2 = <MASK>	RAX RBX RCX RDX	<p>SW_EXITINFO1 =</p> <p><b>0 (SET)</b></p> <p>Set register(s) as identified by the mask in SW_EXITINFO2 (Current Count is not settable)</p> <p><b>1 (GET)</b></p> <p>Get register(s) as identified by the mask in SW_EXITINFO2</p> <p>The registers follow the format of the APIC Timer Registers as documented in <a href="#">AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming</a>, Section 16.4.1 and 10.5.4:</p> <p>MASK[0] RAX = Timer LVT</p> <p>MASK[1] RBX = Divide Configuration</p> <p>MASK[2] RCX = Timer Initial Count</p> <p>MASK[3] RDX = Timer Current Count</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.12 #HV Timer</a></p>	2+

NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
APIC ID List	RAX SW_EXIT_CODE= 0x8000_0017 SW_EXITINFO1	RAX	SW_EXITINFO1 will have the guest physical address of the page(s) to hold the list of APIC IDs  RAX <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> is the number of guest contiguous pages provided to hold the list of APIC IDs <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> is the number of pages required to hold the list of APIC IDs if the input number of pages is not large enough, unchanged otherwise  <a href="#">See 4.1.13 APIC ID List</a>  Availability based on APIC ID List hypervisor feature.	2+
SNP Run VMPL	SW_EXITCODE= 0x8000_0018 SW_EXITINFO1 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		SW_EXITINFO1[31:0] = VMPL level to run  <a href="#">See 4.1.14 SNP Run VMPL</a>  Availability based on SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL hypervisor feature.	2+



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SNP TIO Guest Request	RAX = <DATA GPA> RBX = <DATA PAGE COUNT> RCX = <GUEST PCI ID> RDX SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_0019 SW_EXITINFO1 = <REQ GPA> SW_EXITINFO2 = <RSP GPA>	RBX RDX SW_EXITINFO2	<p>RAX will have the guest physical address of the page(s) to hold sent and/or returned data</p> <p>RBX  <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will contain the number of guest contiguous pages supplied to hold sent and/or returned data  <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> on error will contain the number of guest contiguous pages required to hold the data to be returned</p> <p>RCX will have the guest device PCI device ID which is in BDFn format</p> <p>RDX  <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will have the MMIO range (when request is TIO_MSG_MMIO_VALIDATE_REQ), 0 otherwise  <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> will have TDISP state (when TIO_MSG_TDI_INFO_RSP request), undefined otherwise</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO1 will have the guest physical address of the request page</p> <p>SW_EXITINFO2  <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will have the guest physical address of the response page  <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> Upper 32-bits (63:32) will contain the return code from the hypervisor. Lower 32-bits (31:0) will contain the return code from the firmware call (0 = success)</p> <p>The request page, response page and data page(s) must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared).</p>	2+
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NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
			See <a href="#">4.1.15 SNP TIO Guest Request</a>	
Secure AVIC	<p>RAX = &lt;APIC ID &gt; RBX</p> <p>SW_EXITCODE= 0x8000_001a SW_EXITINFO1</p>	RBX	<p>SW_EXITINFO1 = <b>0</b> <b>(REGISTER_BACKING_PAGE)</b></p> <p>The guest is using the supplied GPA as the AVIC backing page for the specified vCPU</p> <p>RBX <b>State to Hypervisor:</b> will have the guest physical address of the Secure AVIC backing page for the specified vCPU</p> <p><b>1</b> <b>(UNREGISTER_BACKING_PAGE)</b></p> <p>The guest is no longer using the previously set GPA for the vCPU AVIC backing page.</p> <p>RBX <b>State from Hypervisor:</b> will have the guest physical address of the Secure AVIC backing page for the specified vCPU that was REGISTER or 0 if no page was previously REGISTER</p> <p>RAX will have the APIC ID of the target vCPU or 0xffff_ffff_ffff_ffff for the vCPU doing the call</p> <p>See <a href="#">4.1.16 Secure AVIC</a></p>	2+
Hypervisor Feature Support	<p>SW_EXITCODE= 0x8000_ffff SW_EXITINFO1 = 0 SW_EXITINFO2 = 0</p>	SW_EXITINFO2	<p>SW_EXITINFO2</p> <p><b>State from Hypervisor:</b> is the FEATURES bitmap.</p> <p>See <a href="#">2.2 Hypervisor Feature Support</a></p>	2+



NAE Event	State to Hypervisor	State from Hypervisor	Notes	Supported Versions
Termination Request	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_fffe SW_EXITINFO1 = <ERR_CODE> SW_EXITINFO2 = <ERR_INFO>		SW_EXITINFO1 will have the termination reason code  SW_EXITINFO2 may contain an error information code  See <a href="#">4.1.17 Termination Request</a>	2+
Unsupported Event	SW_EXITCODE = 0x8000_ffff SW_EXITINFO1 = <ERR_CODE> SW_EXITINFO2 = 0		SW_EXITINFO1 will have the error code on entry to the VMM Communication exception	All

## 4.1 Invoking VMGEXIT

In general, all NAE events are handled in a standard fashion, except for a few. The standard method is documented in Section 4.1.1. The exceptions are documented following the standard method. The guest has the option of using the #VC handler to trigger VMGEXIT processing or it can para-virtualize the instructions that would cause a #VC and, instead, invoke VMGEXIT processing directly.

Software should ensure that an invocation of VMGEXIT is protected on the vCPU that it will be issued from. For that reason, software should disable interrupts and disable preemption before updating the GHCB and setting the GHCB MSR as well as when accessing the contents of the GHCB following the return from VMGEXIT.

In the context of NMI, it is recommended to have a separate GHCB for use or to save the active GHCB information on entry and restore on exit.

The hypervisor can communicate back to the guest in the event of an error during VMGEXIT processing. The SW\_EXITINFO1 and SW\_EXITINFO2 fields are used for this purpose. Any non-zero value in SW\_EXITINFO1[31:0] should be considered an error returned by the hypervisor.

SW\_EXITINFO1[31:0] defines the action requested by the hypervisor:

- 0x0000
  - No action requested by the hypervisor.
- 0x0001
  - The hypervisor has requested that an exception be issued. The SW\_EXITINFO2 field contains the Event Injection (EVENTINJ) value as documented in [AMD64](#)



*Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming*, Section 15.20.

The currently supported exceptions that can be requested are:

- #GP
- #UD
- 0x0002
  - The hypervisor encountered malformed input for the VMGEXIT. The SW\_EXITINFO2 field may contain further information as documented in [Table 8](#).

**Table 8: Invalid GHCB Reason Codes**

Value	Description
0x0001	The GHCB address was not registered (SEV-SNP)
0x0002	The GHCB Usage value was not valid
0x0003	The SW_SCRATCH field was not valid / could not be mapped
0x0004	The required input fields(s) for the NAE event were not marked valid in the GHCB VALID_BITMAP field
0x0005	The NAE event input was not valid (e.g., an invalid SW_EXITINFO1 value for the AP Jump Table NAE event)
0x0006	The NAE event was not valid
0x0007 – 0xffff	Reserved
0x10000 and above	Available for hypervisor specific reason codes.

#### 4.1.1 Standard VMGExit

- Before issuing the VMGEXIT instruction:
  - Disable interrupts and preemption.
  - Copy the register contents of the faulting context documented in the “State to Hypervisor” column into the corresponding location in the GHCB.
  - Set the bits in the GHCB VALID\_BITMAP field that correspond to the registers documented in the “State to Hypervisor” column.
  - Set the GHCB SW\_EXITCODE, SW\_EXITINFO1 and SW\_EXITINFO2 to the values documented in the “State to Hypervisor” column.
  - Verify or set the GHCB MSR to the guest physical address of the GHCB being used.
- Issue the VMGEXIT instruction.
- After return from the VMGEXIT instruction:
  - Advance the RIP over the instruction that generated the #VC.
  - GHCB SW\_EXITINFO1[31:0] == 0

- Copy the contents of the GHCB registers documented in the “State from Hypervisor” into the corresponding registers to be made available to the faulting context upon completion of the #VC handler.
- GHCB SW\_EXITINFO1[31:0] == 1
  - Invoke the requested exception handling routine, providing as the error code the value contained in GHCB SW\_EXITINFO2.
- Enable preemption and interrupts.

#### **4.1.2 IOIO\_PROT (0x7b)**

The guest #VC handler will be required to parse and decode the instruction that caused the IOIO\_PROT fault (a type of IN/OUT instruction) or it can para-virtualize the instruction to avoid the #VC. In either case, the guest will construct the SW\_EXITINFO1 field as defined in [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Section 15.10.2. If the instruction is a string-based operation, the guest must supply a decrypted buffer for the string operation. The RESERVED shared buffer area within the GHCB (offset 0x800) can be used for this purpose. The guest physical address of the buffer area must be set in the SW\_SCRATCH field. The guest can issue multiple VMGEXIT calls to read or write all the string data.

#### **4.1.3 MSR\_PROT (0x7c)**

The guest #VC handler will be required to parse and decode the instruction that caused the MSR\_PROT fault to determine whether the fault is for a RDMSR or WRMSR or the guest can para-virtualize the instruction to avoid the #VC. In either case, the guest must use the appropriate entry in the NAE Event table for determining the state to supply in the GHCB.

#### **4.1.4 VMSCALL (0x81)**

Hypercalls are specific to the hypervisor under which the guest is running. It is up to the hypervisor to provide support in the guest OS to supply the registers that are required for that specific hypercall. Should the hypervisor not provide support within the guest OS, then only those registers documented in Table 7: List of Supported Non-Automatic Events will be provided.

#### **4.1.5 #NPF/MMIO Access**

To properly determine an MMIO access, MMIO ranges must have a reserved bit set in the nested page tables such that an #NPF will be generated with the page fault error code RSV bit set to 1. This type of #NPF will cause the #VC handler to execute. This can be accomplished by setting bits 51:n in the nested page table entry, where n is equal to the physical address size (CPUID Fn\_8000\_0008\_EAX[7:0]) minus the reduction in physical address size when memory encryption is enabled (CPUID Fn\_8000\_001F\_EBX[11:6]).

The guest will be required to parse and decode the instruction that caused the #NPF fault or the guest can para-virtualize the MMIO access. If either the destination, for an MMIO read, or the source, for an MMIO write, is a memory location, the guest will need to use either the #NPF/MMIO\_READ or #NPF/MMIO\_WRITE NAE events. Based on the instruction, the guest will construct the SW\_EXITCODE, SW\_EXITINFO1, SW\_EXITINFO2 fields. The guest must supply a decrypted buffer for the MMIO operation source/destination. The RESERVED shared buffer area within the GHCB (offset 0x800) can be used for this purpose. The guest physical address of the buffer area must be set in the SW\_SCRATCH field. The guest can issue multiple VMGEXIT calls to read or write all the data:

- MMIO Read:
  - SW\_EXITCODE is set to 0x8000\_0001
  - SW\_EXITINFO1 is the guest physical address of the MMIO source address
  - SW\_EXITINFO2 is the number of bytes to read
  - SW\_SCRATCH is the guest physical address of the decrypted buffer area
    - If the number of bytes to read is greater than the size of the decrypted buffer area, the VMGEXIT can be called multiple times with SW\_EXITINFO2 adjusted to match the actual amount of data to be transferred in the VMGEXIT.
  - Upon return from the VMGEXIT, the contents of the decrypted buffer area are copied to the true destination address of the MMIO instruction.
- MMIO Write:
  - SW\_EXITCODE is set to 0x8000\_0002
  - SW\_EXITINFO1 is the guest physical address of the MMIO destination address
  - SW\_EXITINFO2 is the number of bytes to write
  - SW\_SCRATCH is the guest physical address of the decrypted buffer area
    - If the number of bytes to write is greater than the size of the decrypted buffer area, the VMGEXIT can be called multiple times with SW\_EXITINFO2 adjusted to match the actual amount of data to be transferred in the VMGEXIT.
  - Before issuing the VMGEXIT, the contents of the true source address of the MMIO instruction are copied to the decrypted buffer area.

#### 4.1.6 Page State Change

The Page State Change NAE event allows for an SEV-ES guest, support for which is based on the Page State Change Support for SEV-ES feature bit, or an SEV-SNP guest to request page state changes using the GHCB protocol. The GHCB SW\_SCRATCH area must point to a Page State Change structure that resides in the GHCB Shared Buffer area. The format of the Page State Change structure is:

```
struct page_state_change {
    struct {
        uint16 cur_entry;
        uint16 end_entry;
```

```

        uint32 reserved;
    } page_state_change_header;

    struct {
        // See Table 9: Page State Change Entry
        uint64 cur_page:12;
        uint64 gfn:40;
        uint64 operation:4;
        uint64 pagesize:1;
        uint64 reserved:7;
    } page_state_change_entry[];
};

```

The GHCB Shared Buffer can hold up to 253 Page State Change Entry requests.

**Table 9: Page State Change Entry**

Bit Position	Description
[63:57]	Reserved, must be zero
[56]	Page size (0 = 4K, 1 = 2MB)
[55:52]	Page operation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 0x0001 – Page assignment, Private</li> <li>• 0x0002 – Page assignment, Shared</li> <li>• 0x0003 – PSMASH hint</li> <li>• 0x0004 – UNSMASH hint</li> </ul>
[51:12]	Guest physical frame number (GFN) to perform page operation against
[11:0]	Current page: <p><b>Input:</b> current page is the offset, in 4K increments, on which to begin the page state change operation. For a page size of 4K, this must be 0.</p> <p><b>Output:</b> current page is the offset, in 4K increments, that have been successfully processed. For a page size of 4K, a value of 1 indicates the page has been successfully processed. For a page size of 2M, a value of 512 indicates all the pages have been successfully processed.</p>

A page state change is performed by the hypervisor based on the operation requested. The page state change will be against the system physical address (SPA) that is used to back the guest physical address (GPA) calculated from the supplied guest physical frame number (GFN) for the requested page size ( $GPA = GFN \ll 12$ ).

- 0x0001 – Page assignment, Private  
Requests the hypervisor to make the page private. For an SEV-SNP guest, the hypervisor is requested to also update the RMP table to make the GPA private (guest owned). For a 2MB page size, the provided GFN must represent a 2MB aligned GPA.

- 0x0002 – Page assignment, Shared  
Requests the hypervisor to make the page shared. For an SEV-SNP guest, the hypervisor is requested to also update the RMP table to make the GPA shared (hypervisor owned). For a 2MB page size, the provided GFN must represent a 2MB aligned GPA.
- 0x0003 – PSMASH hint  
For an SEV-SNP guest, the guest is supplying a hint to the hypervisor to update the RMP table to create 512 4K pages from a single 2M page for the GPA. The provided GFN must represent a 2MB aligned GPA. The hypervisor is not required to perform the PSMASH.
- 0x0004 – UNSMASH hint  
For an SEV-SNP guest, the guest is supplying a hint to the hypervisor to update the RMP table to combine 512 4K pages into a single 2M page for the GPA. The provided GFN must represent a 2MB aligned GPA. The hypervisor is not required to perform the UNSMASH.

The `page_state_change_header.cur_entry` is the entry at which the page state change request is to begin processing. The `page_state_change_header.end_entry` is the last entry to process. The hypervisor should ensure that `cur_entry` and `end_entry` represent values within the limits of the GHCB Shared Buffer.

Checking for errors is a bit different than the standard VMGEXIT method. A value of zero in `SW_EXITINFO1` does not guarantee that all operations have completed or completed successfully. As the page state changes are performed against a Page State Change Entry, the Page State Change structure in shared memory must be updated. For each successful update to the RMP table for a Page State Change Entry, `page_state_change_header.cur_entry` must be incremented. Additionally, when the page size is 2MB, the `page_state_change_entry.cur_page` must be incremented for each successful 4K page processed. This allows for the hypervisor to resume the guest at any point during the page state change request and allows the guest to resume the page state change request from the point where it was interrupted. If all entries have been successfully processed, `page_state_change_header.cur_entry` will be greater than `page_state_change_header.end_entry`.

If `page_state_change_header.cur_entry` is not greater than `page_state_change_header.end_entry`, `SW_EXITINFO2` will contain a reason code. The reason codes are defined as follows:

- `SW_EXITINFO2 == 0x00000000`  
The page state change request was interrupted. Retry the request.
- `SW_EXITINFO2[63:32] == 0x00000001`
  - `SW_EXITINFO2[31:0] == 0x00000001`  
The `page_state_change_header` structure is not valid

- SW\_EXITINFO2[31:0] == 0x00000002  
The page\_state\_change\_entry structure, identified by page\_state\_change\_header.cur\_entry, is not valid.
- SW\_EXITINFO2[63:32] == 0x00000002
  - SW\_EXITINFO2[31:0] contains the SNP\_PAGE\_UNSMASH firmware command error code associated with the failing request as identified by page\_state\_change\_header.cur\_entry.
- SW\_EXITINFO2[63:32] == 0x00000003  
This error code can be used to help debug guest page state tracking.
  - SW\_EXITINFO2[31:0] == 0x00000001  
The page\_state\_change\_entry, identified by page\_state\_change\_header.cur\_entry, requested a change to the page state, but the page was already in the requested state. The hypervisor can ignore this condition and not return an error for this page state change request.
  - SW\_EXITINFO2[31:0] == 0x00000002  
The page\_state\_change\_entry, identified by page\_state\_change\_header.cur\_entry, requested a change to the page state, but a 4KB page and 2MB page RMP overlap was detected. The hypervisor can attempt to correct this condition and not return an error for this page state change request.
- SW\_EXITINFO2[63:32] == 0x00000100  
The hypervisor encountered some other error situation and was not able to complete the request identified by page\_state\_change\_header.cur\_entry. It is left to the guest to decide how to proceed in this situation.

#### 4.1.7 SNP Guest Request

The SNP Guest Request NAE event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to make requests to the SEV-SNP firmware through the hypervisor using the SNP\_GUEST\_REQUEST API (see [SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification](#) for a list of possible requests).

The Guest Request NAE event requires two unique pages, one page for the request and one page for the response. Both pages must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared). The guest must supply the guest physical address of the pages (i.e., page aligned) as input.

The hypervisor must translate the guest physical address (GPA) of each page into a system physical address (SPA). The SPA is used to verify that the request and response pages are assigned to the hypervisor.

Before invoking the `SNP_GUEST_REQUEST` API, the hypervisor must assign the response page to the firmware using the `RMPUPDATE` instruction and the SPA of the response page. After the firmware has completed processing the request, the hypervisor must reclaim the response page by invoking the `SNP_PAGE_RECLAIM` API and then assign the page to the hypervisor using the `RMPUPDATE` instruction and the SPA of the response page.

The `SNP_GUEST_REQUEST` API updates a sequence number, `MSG_SEQNO`, when successfully processing the request. It is recommended that the hypervisor validate the guest physical address of the response page before invoking the `SNP_GUEST_REQUEST` API so that the sequence numbers do not get out of sync for the guest, possibly resulting in all successive requests failing.

The hypervisor must save the `SNP_GUEST_REQUEST` return code in the lower 32 bits of the `SW_EXITINFO2` field before completing the Guest Request NAE event.

It is not expected that a guest would issue many Guest Request NAE events. However, access to the SNP firmware is a sequential and synchronous operation. To avoid the possibility of a guest creating a denial-of-service attack against the SNP firmware, it is recommended that some form of rate limiting be implemented should it be detected that a high number of Guest Request NAE events are being issued. To allow for this, the hypervisor may set the `SW_EXITINFO2` field to `0x0000000200000000`, which will inform the guest to retry the request.

Because the message sequence number is used as part of the AES-GCM IV, it is important that the guest retry the request before allowing another request to be performed so that the IV cannot be reused on a new message payload.

A `SW_EXITINFO2` value of 0 indicates a successful completion of the SNP Guest Request.

#### **4.1.8 SNP Extended Guest Request**

The SNP Extended Guest Request NAE event is very similar to the SNP Guest Request NAE event. The difference is related to the additional data that can be returned based on the guest request. Any SNP Guest Request that does not support returning additional data must execute as if invoked as an SNP Guest Request.

The details associated with the SNP Guest Request also apply to the SNP Extended Guest Request. This section documents the additional requirements associated with the data page(s).



**4.1.8.1 MSG\_REPORT\_REQ**

The SNP Extended Guest Request uses the data page(s) to provide certificate data back to the guest. The returned certificates are identified by GUID. Certificate GUIDs are formatted and encoded as defined in RFC 4122. This specification defines the following certificate data GUIDs:

- Versioned Chip Endorsement Key (VCEK) certificate
  - 63da758d-e664-4564-adc5-f4b93be8accd
- AMD SEV Signing Key (ASK) certificate
  - 4ab7b379-bbac-4fe4-a02f-05aef327c782
- AMD Root Signing Key (ARK) certificate
  - c0b406a4-a803-4952-9743-3fb6014cd0ae
- Versioned Loaded Endorsement Key (VLEK) certificate
  - a8074bc2-a25a-483e-aae6-39c045a0b8a1
- Certificate Revocation List
  - 92f81bc3-5811-4d3d-97ff-d19f88dc67ea

The certificate page(s) must be guest contiguous pages if supplying more than one page and all certificate pages must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared).

Returned certificates are identified in a table starting at offset 0x0 of the DATA GPA. Each entry consists of a 16-byte GUID, a 4-byte offset from DATA GPA to where the certificate data starts and a 4-byte length representing the length of the certificate data. The table is terminated with an entry containing all zeroes for the GUID, offset and length.

```
struct cert_table {
    struct {
        unsigned char guid[16];
        uint32 offset;
        uint32 length;
    } cert_table_entry[];
};
```

The hypervisor must validate that the guest has supplied enough pages to hold the certificates that will be returned before performing the SNP guest request. If there are not enough guest pages to hold the certificate table and certificate data, the hypervisor will return the required number of pages needed to hold the certificate table and certificate data in the RBX register and set the SW\_EXITINFO2 field to 0x0000000100000000.

This usage allows the attestation report and the certificates required to verify the report to be returned at the same time. The hypervisor is not required to, or limited to, returning the certificates defined in this specification.

How the hypervisor determines or obtains the certificates to be returned is beyond the scope of this document.



### 4.1.9 SNP AP Creation

The AP Creation NAE event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to cause the creation/destruction of, or a change to, the register state of an AP at the specified VMPL level, which can provide an alternate method of booting an AP under SEV-SNP (see [4.3.2 SEV-SNP \(SNP AP Creation Feature\)](#)). An AP Creation request can:

- **Create or Add**  
Update or create a vCPU at the specified VMPL level for the specified APIC ID. The hypervisor should validate that the supplied VMPL level and the supplied APIC ID is valid for the SEV-SNP guest.  
  
Before invoking the hypervisor, the guest must issue an RMPADJUST instruction against the target page to indicate it will be used as a VMSA page. There are two forms of Create/Add:
  - A VMSA page is provided that is not to be used/installed until an INIT-SIPI sequence is received for the target vCPU.
  - A VMSA page is provided that is to be used/installed immediately for the target vCPU. (The hypervisor should make the vCPU immediately runnable.)
- **Destroy or Remove**  
Update, or destroy, a vCPU with the specified VMPL level and the specified APIC ID. The hypervisor should validate that the supplied VMPL level and the supplied APIC ID is valid for the SEV-SNP guest. After removing the VMSA for the specified vCPU, the vCPU cannot be run at the specified VMPL level until a VMSA is (re)assigned to the vCPU.

When assigning the VMSA address to the vCPU, the hypervisor must use the VMSA page's system physical address (SPA) that is used to back the specified VMSA guest physical address (GPA). Should the hypervisor encounter an error during the request, the vCPU cannot be run at the specified VMPL level until a VMSA is successfully (re)assigned to the vCPU.

Specification of a VMPL level is only valid if the hypervisor advertises the SEV-SNP Multi-VMPL hypervisor feature.

The guest is responsible for tracking what pages it creates and uses as a VMSA page.

It is expected that the SEV\_FEATURES associated with the VMSA for the AP use the same interrupt injection mechanism as the BSP. The hypervisor can fail the SNP AP Creation request if they do not match.

#### **4.1.10 #HV Doorbell Page**

The #HV doorbell page NAE event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to register a doorbell page for use with the hypervisor injection exception (#HV). The doorbell page allows the hypervisor to notify the guest of pending events when the Restricted Injection feature is enabled.

The #HV doorbell page NAE event consists of the following actions:

- **GET\_PREFERRED**  
A guest may use this action to request the hypervisor preferred guest physical address to use for the doorbell page for the vCPU issuing the request. The hypervisor must respond with a page-aligned GPA or 0xffff\_ffff\_ffff\_ffff (the hypervisor does not have a preferred GPA) in the SW\_EXITINFO2 field. If the hypervisor responds with a GPA, it must guarantee that the value cannot otherwise be mapped by the guest. The hypervisor must update the RMP table to make the page a hypervisor-owned (shared) page. The guest should verify that the new GPA is outside of its known memory range.
- **SET**  
A guest must use this action to set the doorbell page to be used for the vCPU issuing the request when the Restricted Injection feature is enabled. The guest must supply a page-aligned GPA in the SW\_EXITINFO2 field. The value can be the hypervisor-preferred value, or a value determined by the guest. If the value is not the hypervisor-preferred value, the guest must make the page a hypervisor-owned (shared) page. If the hypervisor accepts the GPA, then it must respond with the input GPA in the SW\_EXITINFO2 field. If the hypervisor does not accept the GPA, it should follow the standard VMGEXIT error processing protocol to signal a #GP exception.
- **QUERY**  
A guest may use this action to determine if a doorbell page has already been set for the vCPU issuing the request. The hypervisor must respond with the previously set doorbell page GPA in SW\_EXITINFO2. If a doorbell page was not previously set, the hypervisor must respond with 0 in SW\_EXITINFO2.
- **CLEAR**  
A guest may use this action to clear the doorbell page that is currently assigned to the vCPU. The hypervisor will no longer attempt to deliver events using the hypervisor injection exception (#HV) to the vCPU. If the page will no longer be used as a doorbell page, the guest should make the page a guest-owned (private) page.

Refer to SNP Restricted Injection for the specification associated with #HV doorbell page layout and restricted injection support.

### 4.1.11 #HV IPI

The #HV Send IPI NAE event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to send an IPI to other vCPUs in the guest when the Restricted Injection feature is enabled. The SW\_EXITINFO1 field contains the information necessary to perform the IPI. The format of the SW\_EXITINFO1 field is the same as the x2APIC Interrupt Command Register, allowing hypervisors to possibly reuse existing x2APIC IPI emulation support.

Interrupts are delivered as specified in SNP Restricted Injection.

If the Restricted Injection feature is not enabled, the hypervisor may request standard VMGEXIT error processing protocol to signal a #GP exception.

### 4.1.12 #HV Timer

The #HV Timer NAE event allows for an SEV-SNP guest to request timer support from the hypervisor when the Restricted Injection feature is enabled. The hypervisor must provide emulated APIC timer functionality through this NAE event. The APIC timer structure and rules are used for setting and getting timer values. Specifically, the APIC timer registers (Timer LVT, Divide Configuration, Timer Initial Count and Timer Current Count) and the APIC timer rules for starting and stopping the timer, allowing hypervisors to possibly reuse existing APIC timer emulation support.

The #HV Timer NAE event consists of the following actions:

- **SET**  
A guest may use this action to set the various #HV Timer values. The SW\_EXITINFO2 field contains the timer register MASK that identifies the virtual APIC timer registers to set and the registers containing the values to be used:
  - MASK[0] – RAX: Timer LVT
  - MASK[1] – RBX: Divide Configuration
  - MASK[2] – RCX: Timer Initial CountIf multiple bits are set in MASK, the order of assignment is the Timer LVT, Divide Configuration, and then Timer Initial Count.
- **GET**  
A guest may use this action to get the various #HV Timer values. The SW\_EXITINFO2 field contains the timer register MASK that identifies the virtual APIC timer register to get and the registers to return the values in.
  - MASK[0] – RAX: Timer LVT
  - MASK[1] – RBX: Divide Configuration
  - MASK[2] – RCX: Timer Initial Count
  - MASK[3] – RDX: Timer Current Count

Interrupts are delivered as defined in SNP Restricted Injection.

If the Restricted Injection feature is not enabled, the hypervisor may request standard VMGEXIT error processing protocol to signal a #GP exception.

#### **4.1.13 APIC ID List**

The APIC ID List NAE event allows a guest to request the list of APIC IDs associated with the executing guest from the hypervisor. This can be used in place of performing a broadcast INIT-SIPI sequence to discover the APIC IDs. For an SEV-SNP guest, knowing the APIC IDs in advance allows for the booting of APs using the SNP AP Creation NAE event from the very start.

The APIC ID List NAE event requires the minimum number of contiguous guest pages to hold all the APIC IDs that are associated with the guest. All pages supplied must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared). The guest must supply the guest physical address (GPA) of the first page (i.e. page aligned) as input, as well as the number of contiguous pages associated with the GPA. The hypervisor must validate that the guest has supplied enough pages to hold the APIC ID list. If there are not enough guest pages to hold the complete list, the hypervisor must return the required number of pages needed to hold the complete list in the RAX register. Upon return from the NAE event, the guest can determine if the list has been populated by comparing that the supplied number of guest contiguous pages is equal to the returned RAX value.

The hypervisor must translate the GPA of the pages into system physical addresses (SPA). For an SEV-SNP guest, the SPA is used to verify that the pages are assigned to the hypervisor.

The APIC ID list consists of a 4-byte count of APIC ID entries in the list, followed by a 4-byte APIC ID entry for each APIC ID assigned to the guest. The format of the APIC ID list is:

```
struct apic_id_list {
    u32 count;
    u32 apic_ids[];
};
```

#### **4.1.14 SNP Run VMPL**

The SNP Run VMPL NAE event allows a guest to request the hypervisor to run the current vCPU at a different VMPL level. This is accomplished by associating a unique VMSA with each VMPL. Not every VMPL level is required to have a VMSA. If a VMPL level is requested that does not have a VMSA, an error must be returned by the hypervisor.

Each VMPL level may also have a unique GHCB associated with it. When changing VMPL levels, the hypervisor must update the system physical address (SPA) for the VMSA and the GHCB before running the vCPU.

### 4.1.15 SNP TIO Guest Request

The SEV-TIO extension provides a mechanism for guests to bind to and use trusted devices within their guest private address space.

The SNP guest discovers the new request type support via the TEE-IO PCIe capabilities register of a passed through device.

The device is bound to the SNP Guest upon the first SNP TIO Guest Request. For TIO-unenlightened guests willing to run devices in a trusted manner, a firmware running at VMPL0 is expected to perform the necessary setup. Otherwise, the OS running in the SNP guest performs the setup which includes: fetching the device info, fetching and validating the interface report, configuring MMIO, and configuring the IOMMU.

The SNP TIO Guest Request NAE event is very similar to the SNP Guest Request and SNP Extended Guest Request NAE events.

The difference is related to the non-optional unencrypted data that needs to be supplied by the guest and returned by the hypervisor based on the encrypted guest request, which includes:

- Guest PCI ID (RCX) to identify the TDI context page required for calling the SEV-SNP firmware, and potentially allow the firmware to interact with the host PCI function;
- MMIO range (RDX) to be transitioned to the firmware state before proceeding with the MMIO\_VALIDATE\_REQ request, the range is encoded as follows:
  - [0..2] range ID;
  - [3] desired state to set RMP.Validated for the range;
  - [4..11] size as order of 4KB pages;
  - [12..51] guest physical page number of the MMIO range;
- TDISP status (RDX) to inform the SNP guest about the current state of a TDI on the TDI\_INFO\_REQ request, defined in the SEV-TIO specification.

The details associated with the SNP Guest Request also apply to the SNP TIO Guest Request. This section documents the additional requirements associated with the data pages.

The SNP TIO Guest Request uses the data pages to optionally provide data to the hypervisor and to provide measurements, certificates and a TDISP attestation report back to the guest. The hypervisor always returns the number of pages required to store measurements, certificates, and the TDISP attestation report. The data pages must be guest contiguous pages if providing more than one page and all data pages must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared). Providing memory for this data is optional.

For a TIO\_MSG\_TDI\_INFO\_REQ guest request, the data pages can be used by the guest to provide a 32 byte nonce. If data pages are provided and the first 32 bytes of the data pages are

non-zero, the hypervisor will issue the TDI\_DEV\_MEASUREMENTS command to the SEV firmware, using the first 32-bytes as the measurements nonce, before continuing with the guest TIO\_MSG\_TDI\_INFO\_REQ command. Upon receiving the TDI\_DEV\_MEASUREMENTS command, SEV firmware will read new measurements from the device and use the measurements nonce to calculate a new measurements digest to guarantee freshness of the measurements returned to the guest. After completion of the TDI\_DEV\_MEASUREMENTS command, the hypervisor will then forward the TIO\_MSG\_TDI\_INFO\_REQ guest request on to the SEV firmware.

The data pages must be guest contiguous pages if supplying more than one page and all data pages must be assigned to the hypervisor (shared).

Returned data are identified in a table starting at offset 0x0 of the DATA GPA. Each entry consists of a 16-byte GUID, a 4-byte offset from DATA GPA to where the data blob starts and a 4-byte length representing the length of the data. The table is terminated with an entry containing all zeroes for the GUID, offset and length. Data GUIDs are formatted and encoded as defined in RFC 4122.

```
struct blob_table {
    struct {
        unsigned char guid[16];
        uint32 offset;
        uint32 length;
    } table_entry[];
};
```

This specification defines the following data GUIDs:

- Measurements blob:
  - 5caa80c6-12ef-401a-b364-ec59a93abe3f
- Certificates blob:
  - 078ccb75-2644-49e8-afe7-5686c5cf72f1
- Attestation report:
  - 70dc5b0e-0cc0-4cd5-97bb-ff0ba25bf320

The hypervisor must validate that the guest has supplied enough pages to hold the data that will be returned before performing the SNP guest request. If there are not enough guest pages to hold all the data, the hypervisor will return the required number of pages in the RBX register and set the SW\_EXITINFO2 field to 0x0000\_0001\_0000\_0000.

This usage allows the certificates, the measurements, the TDISP attestation report required to verify the report to be returned at the same time. The hypervisor may not have some of the data loaded from a device if the TIO setup has not been completed, in such case the corresponding length field will be 0. It is the hypervisor's responsibility to have the data available at the time of the SNP TIO Guest Request NAE request.

How the hypervisor obtains the certificates, measurements and SPDm attestation report to be returned is beyond the scope of this document.

#### **4.1.16 Secure AVIC**

The Secure AVIC feature provides support for managing guest-owned APIC state for SEV-SNP guests using a private, guest-owned backing page per vCPU.

##### **4.1.16.1 Backing Page Support**

Secure AVIC requires the guest vCPU APIC backing page to be always present in the guest's nested paging table (NPT) while the vCPU is running. Two actions are available to the guest to notify the hypervisor of these pages. The APIC ID (RAX) is used to identify the vCPU to which the backing page action is related. An APIC ID value of 0xffff\_ffff\_ffff\_ffff means that the backing page action is for the vCPU performing the call.

- **REGISTER\_BACKING\_PAGE**  
A guest should use this action to inform the hypervisor of the page-aligned GPA (RBX) that will be used as the Secure AVIC backing page for the specified vCPU. The hypervisor must then ensure that the specified GPA is always present in the NPT of the guest while the specified vCPU is running. Setting a Secure AVIC backing page GPA automatically clears any currently set Secure AVIC backing page GPA.
- **UNREGISTER\_BACKING\_PAGE**  
A guest may use this action to inform the hypervisor that the previously set GPA is no longer being used as the Secure AVIC backing page for the specified vCPU. This removes the requirement on the hypervisor to ensure that the specified GPA is always present in the NPT of the guest while the specified vCPU is running. The hypervisor will return (RBX) the GPA that was currently SET or 0 if there was no previously set GPA.

A feature bit isn't required to advertise the availability of this NAE event and these actions. The setting of Secure AVIC in SEV\_FEATURES implies that the support is present.

#### **4.1.17 Termination Request**

The termination request NAE event allows for the guest to request termination. The guest should expect the hypervisor to comply with the request for termination. As a safeguard, it is recommended that the guest incorporate an HLT loop or SHUTDOWN following the VMGEXIT.

The termination request will follow the same general format as the MSR protocol termination request with the added ability to provide 64 bits of termination information in SW\_EXITINFO2. SW\_EXITINFO1 contains the termination reason code where SW\_EXITINFO1[3:0] specifies the reason code set and SW\_EXITINFO1[11:4] contains the reason code from that reason code set.



The reason code set is meant to provide hypervisors with their own termination reason codes. This document defines and owns reason code set 0x0 and the following reason codes (SW\_EXITINFO1[11:4]):

- 0x00 – General termination request
- 0x01 – SEV-ES / GHCB Protocol range is not supported
- 0x02 – SEV-SNP feature(s) not supported
  - SW\_EXITINFO2 contains a mask of the unsupported features that are specified in the SEV\_FEATURES field of the VMSA (read via the SEV\_STATUS MSR)

#### **4.1.18 Unsupported Non-Automatic Exits**

Should the #VC handler be invoked for a NAE that is not part of the negotiated protocol version, it should perform a VMGEXIT using the “Unsupported Event” exit code.

## **4.2 Guest Identification of SEV-ES Support**

A guest must be able to determine that it is running as an SEV-ES guest. To accomplish this, the hypervisor must provide additional CPUID properties to an SEV-ES guest. These properties allow the SEV-ES guest to determine that it is safe to issue the required CPUID and RDMSR instructions, as well as provide required information. The hypervisor must be sure that the following CPUID information is set:

- CPUID leaf 0x0000\_0001:
  - ECX[31] must be set to indicate running under a hypervisor
- CPUID leaf 0x8000\_001f:
  - EAX[1] must be set to indicate SEV support
  - EBX[5:0] must be the encryption bit position as discovered by the hypervisor
  - EBX[11:6] must be the reduction in physical address space bits for the guest

## **4.3 SMP Booting**

### **4.3.1 SEV-ES and SEV-SNP**

SMP booting under SEV-ES presents new challenges. Traditionally, the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence is used to boot an AP. Under virtualization, the SIPI request results in the hypervisor setting the vCPU CS segment register and IP register. The challenge here is that the hypervisor is not allowed to set the vCPU registers after they have been measured and encrypted, which occurs before the guest is started. A new way of booting an AP must be performed. The very first time an AP is started, it must use the register values that were initially set and measured when LAUNCH\_UPDATE\_VMSA was invoked.



SMP booting under SEV-SNP when the hypervisor does not support the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event has the same challenges. After the registers have been set and measured by `SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE`, they cannot be updated. Note that when the Restricted Injection feature is active in an SEV-SNP guest, the AP Reset Hold NAE event is not available because an APIC is not available, removing the ability of the guest to issue an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence. Restricted Injection requires the use of the SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event (see [4.3.2 SEV-SNP \(SNP AP Creation Feature\)](#)).

The following are examples of setting the initial CS segment register and IP register for the APs first boot:

- Using the standard reset vector location:
  - Update the code mapped at the reset vector to check a memory location. This memory location, if non-zero, will contain the target address (SIPI vector) for the CPU that is booting.
    1. On initial BSP boot, the value will be zero so normal BSP initialization will be performed.
    2. When the BSP attempts to start an AP, it will place the AP target address into the memory location. The AP will see a non-zero value and jump to that location.
- Using a supplied reset vector location:
  - Provide a predetermined location to the hypervisor as the initial CS segment register value and IP register value.
    1. For example, the UEFI firmware used to initialize the guest can have a compiled-in location consisting of a CS segment register value and an IP register value that can be discovered by the hypervisor prior to guest execution. These values can be used as the initial values for the guest APs.
    2. When the BSP attempts to start an AP, it will place code into this initial location to direct the AP to the desired target address.

The hypervisor is then required to do the following:

- For the first reset of the AP, the following is required:
  - The hypervisor must not update any register values and, instead, run the vCPU with the initial register values.
- For subsequent resets of the AP, the following is required:
  - When a guest AP reaches its HLT loop (or similar method for parking the AP), it instead can either:
    1. Issue an AP Reset Hold NAE event.
      - This requires the AP to be in PAE or long mode to write decrypted values to the GHCB. The AP does not have to remain in PAE or long mode after the GHCB has been updated.
    2. Issue the AP Reset Hold Request MSR Protocol.

- The hypervisor treats either request like the guest issued an HLT instruction and marks the vCPU as halted.
- When the hypervisor receives a SIPI request for the vCPU, it will not update any register values. Instead, it will complete either the AP Reset Hold NAE event or the AP Reset Hold MSR protocol.
- Mark the vCPU as active, allowing the VMGEXIT to complete.
- Upon return from the VMGEXIT, the AP must transition from its current execution mode into real mode and begin executing at the reset vector supplied in the SIPI request.
  1. The AP should verify that the SW\_EXITINFO2 field or GHCBData[63:12] field is non-zero. If zero, the guest should reissue the hold request.
  2. The following registers must be set to the Initial Processor State after INIT (see [AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual, Volume 2: System Programming](#), Table 14-1):
    - RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX, RSI, RDI, RBP, R8 – R15, RFLAGS
  3. The remaining registers are not required to be set to the Initial Processor State after INIT.

#### 4.3.1.1 vCPU Parking

Another challenge that arises is transferring control from one environment to the next, for example, from UEFI to an OS. Using the UEFI-to-OS example, before control is handed to the OS, UEFI will park all APs using an HLT loop or similar. This code will be in reserved memory and be running in 32-bit protected mode with paging disabled. This allows the AP HLT loop to execute should a signal bring the AP out of the HLT instruction. However, instead of issuing an HLT instruction, the AP will issue a VMGEXIT with SW\_EXITCODE of 0x8000\_0004. (This implies that the GHCB was updated prior to leaving 64-bit long mode.)

When the OS attempts to boot the AP, the code that will execute will be that of UEFI. At this point, the AP needs to have been told by the OS where to execute. To this end, UEFI needs to supply an AP jump table to the OS. The OS will use this memory to set the address of the AP reset vector:

- Upon return from the VMGEXIT, the AP must transition from its current execution mode into real mode and begin executing at the reset vector supplied by the OS in the AP jump table. The 4-byte value from the AP jump table will be in the first 4 bytes of the page and match the following format:

```
struct Ap_Reset_Address {
    uint16 reset_ip;
    uint16 reset_cs;
};
```

For example, to begin executing at physical address 0x9f000, the value 0x0000 would be stored at offset 0x00 of the AP jump table and the value 0x9f00 would be stored at offset 0x02

of the AP jump table. The UEFI code could push RFLAGS onto the stack, followed by the CS value of 0x9f00 and finally the RIP value of 0x0000 and then issue an IRET to begin executing at 0x9f000. An alternative is to use a far jump to load the new CS/RIP value.

- If the same reset vector is used for all APs, there is no need for serialization of the AP jump table entry. However, if different values are used for different APs or different situations, then the use of the AP reset address field must be serialized.

The AP jump table must be communicated by UEFI to the OS. The requirements are different, depending on the type of guest:

- SEV-ES guest:  
UEFI must use the AP Jump Table SET software NAE Event to tell the hypervisor to set/save the AP jump table guest physical address.

The OS must use the AP Jump Table GET software NAE Event to retrieve the location of the AP jump table when starting an AP.

- SEV-SNP guest  
UEFI must supply the AP jump table guest physical address in the SEV-SNP Secrets Page (see [2.7 SEV-SNP Secrets Page](#)).

The OS must use the AP jump table guest physical address as set in the SEV-SNP Secrets Page when starting an AP.

The AP jump table must be 4K in size, in encrypted memory, and it must be 4K (page) aligned. There can be only one AP jump table, and it should reside in memory that has been marked as reserved by UEFI.

#### **4.3.1.2 vCPU Hotplug**

Because of the requirements to measure and encrypt the VM register state before launching the guest, vCPU hotplug cannot be supported at this time.

#### **4.3.2 SEV-SNP (SNP AP Creation Feature)**

Using VMGEXIT SW\_EXITCODE 0x8000\_0013, an SEV-SNP guest can create or update the vCPU state of an AP, which may allow for a simpler and more secure method of booting an AP.

An SEV-SNP guest must use the RMPADJUST instruction to mark a page as a VM Save Area (VMSA) page. This page can then be used to initialize or change the vCPU state of an AP using VMGEXIT SW\_EXITCODE 0x8000\_0013. Using this method, a guest no longer is required to issue the AP Reset Hold NAE event.

There are two forms of the AP Create NAE event for creating or adding a VMSA page that can be performed depending upon the value supplied in SW\_EXITINFO1:

- 0

- The VMSA page is not to be used until an INIT request for the target AP is received. (This request is not compatible with the Restricted Injection feature.)
- 1
  - The VMSA page is to be used immediately (makes the vCPU runnable) for the target AP.

#### 4.3.2.1 vCPU Parking

No special requirements are needed for parking a vCPU. The AP state can be set via SW\_EXITCODE 0x8000\_0013, allowing the guest to control bringing an AP out of the parked state. Using this method, a guest no longer is required to save the AP Jump Table address in the SEV-SNP Secrets Page.

#### 4.3.2.2 vCPU Hotplug

Because of the ability for a guest to supply VMSA pages to the hypervisor, the AP creation NAE event allows for vCPU hotplug to be supported.

## 4.4 Non-maskable Interrupts

When injecting an NMI, the hypervisor must not intercept IRET, but must intercept #DB. The hypervisor must use the “NMI Complete” message from the guest as the indicator of when another NMI can be injected. Intercepting #DB, which a hypervisor typically already does today, provides the guest with flexibility in determining when to send the “NMI Complete” message.

The benefit of this method is that the guest processing does not need to be documented in the GHCB specification, just the requirement that the guest only issue the “NMI Complete” message when it can safely handle another NMI. This allows a guest OS to do what is easiest/best for it.

Here is one example of how the guest OS could do this:

- Use the #DB exception
  - NMI handler sets a per-CPU variable to indicate in NMI
  - Just before the actual NMI IRET, the TF flag is set:
    - PUSHF, OR flags on stack to set TF, POPF
    - The IRET must be the next instruction after the POPF
  - Execute IRET
    - #VC is triggered with an error code for a #DB intercept (0x41)
  - #VC handler is invoked and checks for NMI scenario:
    - Checks for error code of #DB intercept (0x41)
    - Checks per-CPU variable to ensure that an NMI was running
    - Clears per-CPU variable
    - Issues "NMI Complete" message using VMGEXIT
    - Exits the #VC handler

## 4.5 Debug Register Support

Full virtualization of hardware debug registers is supported for SEV-ES guests on hardware that supports "DebugVirtualization." This support is enabled by setting the "DebugVirtualization" bit in the SEV\_FEATURES field of the VM Save Area (VMSA). Hardware will restore and save the debug register state in the VMSA. The hypervisor should clear all intercepts for all the hardware debug registers.

If virtualization of hardware debug registers is not supported for SEV-ES guests, the hypervisor must set the intercept for both read and write of the debug control register (DR7). With the intercepts in place, the #VC handler will be invoked when the guest accesses DR7. For a write to DR7, the #VC handler should perform Standard VMGExit processing. The #VC handler must not update the actual DR7 register, but rather it should cache the DR7 value being written. For a read of DR7, the #VC handler should return the cached value of the DR7 register.

## 4.6 System Management Mode (SMM)

SMM will not be supported in this version of the specification.

## 4.7 Nested Virtualization

Nested virtualization is not supported under SEV-ES and SEV-SNP.

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## 5 SNP Restricted Injection

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### 5.1 Hypervisor Doorbells in SNP guests

Safe isolation between an SNP-protected guest and its host environment requires restrictions on the type of exception and interrupt dispatch that can be performed in the guest. Isolated guests are expected to run with the SNP RestrictInjection feature active, limiting the host to ringing a doorbell with a #HV exception. The majority of information communicated by the host is specific to the virtualization architecture (e.g. Virtio or VMBus messages) and will be delivered in a manner that is understood by the specific drivers running within the guest. However, dispatch of these messages is typically driven by interrupt delivery, which is core to the operating system rather than to the drivers themselves. Consequently, it is advantageous to define a common format to describe notifications whose dispatch is integral to OS functionality. At the same time, it is advantageous to avoid a common format for information that is normally only interpreted by drivers, so these drivers have the flexibility to optimize their communication paths as they see fit. This document defines the set of information that provides the common core of host notification, and the format by which it is communicated.

### 5.2 Essential Data

Virtual machines typically rely on interrupt delivery through an architectural APIC, even for synthetic messages delivered by the host. The common #HV doorbell data is structured to align with APIC behavior, so that existing guest interrupt dispatch and management logic can be used.

Two fields are defined in the #HV doorbell page: a pending event field (“PendingEvent”) and an EOI assist (“NoEoiRequired”). PendingEvent is a 16-bit field in bytes 0..1 of the page, and NoEoiRequired is byte 2 of the page. Bytes 3..63 are reserved to accommodate future expansion of required functionality. The structure of the remainder of the page is not specified and should be used by the virtualization stack as required for its own message formats.

Because the doorbell page is shared with the host, the physical page that backs it must be a host-owned page (not assigned with RMPUPDATE). All guest accesses must be made with C=0.

PendingEvent is defined as follows:

- PendingEvent[15] (“NoFurtherSignal”) - indicates that the host will not signal #HV due to another non-maskable event until this bit is cleared by the guest.
  - PendingEvent[14:10] – reserved for future use
  - PendingEvent[[9] - indicates that the host is presenting a virtual #MC to the guest. This is an example of a non-maskable event.
  - PendingEvent[8] - indicates that the host is presenting an NMI to the guest. This is an example of a non-maskable event.
-

- PendingEvent[7:0] - an 8-bit interrupt vector number. When this number is non-zero, it indicates that the host is presenting an interrupt on the specified vector. After the guest acknowledges receipt of the vector (as described below), the interrupt is placed in service in the host-emulated APIC. When the guest has completed service of the interrupt, it must issue an end-of-interrupt cycle with the host-emulated APIC.

It is desirable to optimize end-of-interrupt indications without requiring exiting the VM. When it is possible to perform an EOI without exiting the guest, NoEoiRequired will be set to a non-zero value by the host, indicating that no explicit EOI is required. When the guest wishes to perform an EOI, it should attempt to atomically change NoEoiRequired from non-zero to zero. If successful, no further processing is necessary; if unsuccessful, the guest must request an explicit EOI by performing VMGEXIT to request a WRMSR to the X2APIC EOI MSR.

Specific treatment of the PendingEvent and NoEoiRequired fields is amplified below.

## 5.3 Interrupt Shadows

Typical interrupt delivery involves a careful use of interrupt shadows leading up to an HLT instruction to ensure that a guest can never inadvertently dispatch all pending interrupts before executing HLT. Because #HV is delivered without regard to interrupt shadows, guests lose the ability to control interaction between HLT and interrupts. Consequently, a different convention is required. When a guest is ready to enter a halt state, it should not examine pending interrupt state, nor should it enable interrupts; it should execute HLT with interrupts disabled. If the host receives an HLT intercept while the guest has any interrupts or non-maskable events pending, it should immediately re-enter the guest. When a guest resumes following an HLT instruction, it should immediately proceed to examine interrupt state as if it has just received a #HV. This convention ensures that a guest can properly suspend when no interrupts are pending while also ensuring that a guest will neither miss pending interrupts nor suspend before all interrupt processing has properly completed.

## 5.4 Expected Behaviors

### 5.4.1 Doorbell configuration

Configuration of the doorbell page should be performed through specific VMGEXIT requests communicated via the GHCB.

Configuration of the #HV doorbell page can be performed using VMGEXIT SW\_EXITCODE 0x8000\_0014. A brief outline of the available functions is listed below. Refer to [4.1.10 #HV Doorbell Page](#) for a full description of the operations.



- **GET\_PREFERRED**  
A guest may use this action to request the hypervisor-preferred guest physical address to use for the doorbell page for the vCPU issuing the request.
- **SET**  
A guest must use this action to set the doorbell page to be used for the vCPU issuing the request when the Restricted Injection feature is enabled.
- **QUERY**  
A guest may use this action to determine if a doorbell page has already been set for the vCPU issuing the request.

Whenever the host accepts a mapping of a doorbell page, it is free to execute RMPUPDATE to clear the RMP assignment of the page mapped at that guest physical address. Note that a well-behaved guest will execute PVALIDATE to relinquish access to the page prior to handing it over to the host, as is typically required to ensure security of the RMP (as documented elsewhere). After the page is mapped, it must be accessed by the guest with C=0 in the guest PTE. If the host is asked to remap the doorbell page at a new location, it is not expected to execute RMPUPDATE to assign a guest page at the old guest physical address; if the guest wants to make use of that guest physical address again, it must use a page assignment protocol (documented elsewhere) to request an assigned page at that location before attempting to use it again with C=1.

### **5.4.2 Host Behavior**

The host is expected to emulate APIC behavior faithfully, at least with respect to interrupt presentation (ready, acknowledge, in-service, and EOI semantics). The manner in which individual interrupt sources are configured is presumed to be specific to the virtualization stack, but the lifecycle of an interrupt vector through the emulated APIC should adhere to the APIC architecture.

Whenever the host determines that an interrupt source is ready to be delivered (i.e., ready, not in service, and at a higher priority than the highest-priority interrupt presently in service), it must present it to the guest by writing to the vector number to vector field of PendingEvent in the doorbell page. The host does not have the ability to determine the logical TPR in use by the guest, nor the guest value of EFLAGS.IF, so it should simply present the interrupt by writing the APIC vector number. This should occur at a time that the guest vCPU is not running.

- If PendingEvent.Vector was previously zero AND if PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal was previously zero, the host should schedule delivery of a #HV to indicate to the guest that a new interrupt is available.



- If PendingEvent.Vector was previously non-zero, because the guest has not yet chosen to acknowledge the interrupt, the previous vector number can be overwritten by the new vector number without sending another #HV (regardless of the value of PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal), because the guest should already have been informed that a vector was pending. If the host is required to send #HV, it must also set PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal to ensure that no additional #HV is sent as a result of a non-maskable event (as explained below) until the guest indicates that it is ready to receive it.

*Note: The host is always expected to present the highest-priority ready interrupt, so if a non-zero vector number is overwritten, it should always be overwritten with a higher-priority vector. The host must additionally record internally the last vector that was presented.*

Whenever the host presents an interrupt, and there are no other interrupts ready to be presented (i.e., all lower-priority interrupts are already in service), the host should set NoEoiRequired to indicate that no explicit EOI is required. The host should additionally record internally that NoEoiRequired was set. If, on the other hand, multiple interrupts are ready, the host should clear NoEoiRequired, and should record internally that NoEoiRequired was cleared. When multiple interrupts are ready, the host must know precisely when the guest is ready to receive the second interrupt, and this requires an explicit EOI cycle.

Whenever the host wishes to present a non-maskable event such as an NMI or #MC, the host should set the appropriate bit in the PendingEvent field. The host should also set PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal. If NoFurtherSignal was previously zero, the host should deliver #HV, while if NoFurtherSignal was previously non-zero, then the guest should already be aware that event processing is required.

Whenever the host observes that PendingEvent.Vector is zero but has internally recorded that a non-zero vector was presented, it indicates that the interrupt was acknowledged by the guest. As this is analogous to an interrupt being acknowledged at the APIC by the CPU, the host must mark the interrupt in service so that it can be cancelled by a subsequent EOI.

Whenever the host observes NoEoiRequired is zero and has internally recorded that NoEoiRequired was previously set, it should perform an EOI cycle as if the APIC EOI register had been written. This must occur after examining PendingEvent.Vector, as an EOI may be pending for the interrupt that was just acknowledged by the guest.

Whenever an EOI cycle is completed (either implicitly by clearing NoEoiRequired or explicitly via an APIC register write), the host should set NoEoiRequired again if any interrupts remain in service and no interrupts are pending (and should additionally record internally that the flag was set). Note that the guest is not obligated to clear NoEoiRequired and may elect to perform a virtual APIC register write to complete the EOI. The host must treat both types of EOI signals identically.

Examination of PendingEvent and NoEoiRequired can be performed by the host at any time the guest vCPU is not running, but must be performed at any time the emulated APIC state is evaluated. Examination of those fields is not required if the host has not recorded that it has placed any data into them.

If a non-cooperative guest chooses to write a non-zero vector into PendingEvent.Vector when no interrupt is pending or chooses to set PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal without receiving a #HV signal, it may result in the loss of a #HV notification when the host is prepared to deliver an interrupt. Any bad behavior that results in the guest is a consequence of its non-cooperation, but it will not affect the integrity of the host in any way. Similarly, the host will not be affected if a non-cooperative guest chooses to modify NoEoiRequired when no EOI assist is possible.

### **5.4.3 Guest Behavior**

Whenever a guest receives a #HV notification, it must be prepared to receive an interrupt from the emulated APIC. This can occur at any time; the guest may choose to acknowledge it immediately or to defer acknowledgement until EFLAGS.IF permits interrupt delivery.

When the guest chooses to acknowledge an interrupt, it must perform an atomic exchange to retrieve the pending event information and to zero the contents of PendingEvent. Because the guest can be interrupted on any instruction boundary, and because the host has the right to exchange one non-zero vector for another without issuing another #HV, the guest must not act on any vector number observed in the doorbell page unless it is atomically exchanged with zero. After the vector number has been observed, the guest can process the interrupt as it sees fit, either dispatching it immediately or deferring dispatch until such time that dispatch is safe. After the guest has acknowledged the interrupt, it must assume that the interrupt has been acknowledged in accordance with the standard APIC architecture (i.e., no additional interrupt of equal or lower priority can be presented until an end-of-interrupt cycle is performed).

When the guest is ready to perform an EOI, it should perform an atomic exchange of zero with NoEoiRequired. If the previous value was non-zero, then no further action is required because the act of clearing NoEoiRequired is sufficient to prompt an end of interrupt before delivery of the next interrupt. If the previous value was zero, then the guest must perform an APIC register write (via VMGEXIT to write the X2APIC MSR) to complete the EOI.

Even when EFLAGS.IF=0, a guest should be prepared to dispatch non-maskable events as indicated in PendingEvent. If a guest chooses to dispatch only non-maskable events without clearing the pending vector, it must perform an atomic exchange to clear the non-maskable event flags as well as NoFurtherSignal before proceeding to dispatch any accumulated events. Leaving PendingEvent.Vector unchanged ensures that the guest will not receive a #HV signal due only to changes in maskable interrupt state, while clearing NoFurtherSignal ensures that the guest will receive another #HV if an additional non-maskable event is delivered.

Because a non-cooperative host may write random numbers into the doorbell page, the guest must validate each vector it observes to ensure that it corresponds to a legitimate, expected interrupt. A non-cooperative host may choose not to send #HV and may similarly choose to ignore NoEoiRequired; both of these cases result in denial of service to the guest rather than any corruption of guest state. A non-cooperative host may signal #HV at any time it chooses, possibly resulting in recursive handling by the guest; however, a guest can assume that under normal operation, the host will never inject #HV if PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal is non-zero, and any receipt of #HV at any other time is grounds for a system panic.

## 5.5 Pseudocode

### 5.5.1 Host

```
; when ready to update APIC state (e.g. evaluation of ready interrupts,
; EOI requests)

; check to see whether the guest has acknowledged a previously presented
; interrupt
IF APIC.PendingVector != 0 AND Doorbell.PendingEvent.Vector = 0
    ; acknowledge interrupt
    APIC.Ready[APIC.PendingVector] := 0
    APIC.InService[APIC.PendingVector] := 1
    APIC.PendingVector := 0
FI

; check to see whether the guest has requested an EOI without explicitly
; writing the EOI register
IF APIC.NoEoiRequired AND Doorbell.NoEoiRequired = 0 AND APIC.PendingVector = 0
    APIC.EndOfInterrupt()
    APIC.NoEoiRequired := 0
FI

; calculate ready interrupt state
HV_Required := false
IF NMI is pending
    Doorbell.PendingEvent.NMI := 1
    HV_Required := true
FI
IF #MC is pending
    Doorbell.PendingEvent.MC := 1
    HV_Required := true
FI
IF APIC.Ready is not empty
    ; an explicit EOI is required unless the interrupt being presented is the
    ; only ready interrupt
    IF APIC.NumberOfReadyInterrupts = 1
        APIC.NoEoiRequired := true
        Doorbell.NoEoiRequired := 1
    ELSE
        APIC.NoEoiRequired := false
        Doorbell.NoEoiRequired := 0
    FI
    APIC.PendingVector := next ready interrupt
```

```

    IF Doorbell.PendingEvent.Vector = 0
        ; only send #HV if there is no interrupt already pending
        HV_Required := true
    FI
    Doorbell.PendingEvent.Vector := APIC.PendingVector
FI
IF HV_Required
    IF Doorbell.PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal = 0
        Doorbell.PendingEvent.NoFurtherSignal := 1
    ELSE
        HV_Required := FALSE
    FI
FI
IF HV_Required
    Schedule #HV
FI

```

## 5.5.2 Guest

```

; when the guest is ready to dispatch interrupts
IF EFLAGS.IF = 0
    NonMaskableEvents := XCHG(Doorbell.PendingEvent[15..8], 0)
    ; handle NMI or #MC as required
    ; leave handler
FI

PendingEvent := XCHG(Doorbell.PendingEvent, 0)
IF (PendingEvent.NMI OR PendingEvent.MC)
    ; handle NMI or #MC as required
FI

IF PendingEvent.Vector != 0
    ; dispatch interrupt or schedule it internally for future delivery
FI

; upon completion of the active interrupt
NoEoiRequired := XCHG(Doorbell.NoEoiRequired, 0)
IF NoEoiRequired = 0
    WRMSR(X2APIC_EOI)
FI

```